

JPRS-TAC-92-005
7 FEBRUARY 1992



JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-92-005

CONTENTS

7 February 1992

CHINA

Koreas Exchange Copies of Non-Nuclear Accord [XINHUA 21 Jan]	1
XINHUA Notes U.S. ABM Treaty 'Abandonment' [27 Jan]	1

EAST ASIA

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

ASEAN Summit Meeting Considers Southeast Asia Peace Zone	2
Indonesian President Backs Idea [Jakarta Radio 27 Jan]	2
Philippines' Aquino on Defense Cooperation [BERNAMA 27 Jan]	2

SOUTH KOREA

Cabinet Approves Nuclear-Free Korea Accord [YONHAP 23 Jan]	2
Defense Ministry To Begin Disarmament Plans [YONHAP 28 Jan]	2

EAST EUROPE

POLAND

'Caution' Urged on Russian Troop Withdrawal Promises [PAP 21 Jan]	4
CIS Commander's Comments on Withdrawal Talks Criticized	4
Polish General Comments [Warsaw TV 26 Jan]	4
Spokesman Comments Further [M. Gugulski; Warsaw Radio 27 Jan]	4

LATIN AMERICA

CUBA

Havana Critiques Bush State of Union Address [O. Contreras; Havana Radio 29 Jan]	6
--	---

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

GENERAL

Academician Ponders CIS Nuclear Future, Treaties [V. Goldanskiy; IZVESTIYA 11 Jan]	7
U.S. 'Peace-Loving Intentions' Questioned [V. Prozorov; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 16 Jan]	8
Coordination Group To Eliminate Nuclear Arms [INTERFAX 17 Jan]	9

START TALKS

Nazarkin Argues for START Treaty Approval [MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN Jan]	9
Kozyrev, Bartholomew Hold Disarmament Talks	14
Discuss Nuclear Arms Elimination, CIS Control [TASS 17 Jan]	14
Discuss Army Stabilization [Moscow Radio 17 Jan]	14

Reports, Comments on SS-19 ICBM Launch From Kazakhstan	15
Nazarbayev Statement [G. Kulagin; TASS 21 Jan]	15
Raises Doubts Over Control [V. Nadein; IZVESTIYA 21 Jan]	15
Kazakhstan Not Informed [I. Ambrosev; Radio Rossii 22 Jan]	16
Official Interviewed [Moscow TV 22 Jan]	17
Further on Launch [Moscow TV 22 Jan]	17
Military Official Denies START Violation [Yu. Gusev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 23 Jan]	18
Commission To Regulate Cosmodromes [Moscow Radio 23 Jan]	18
SS-19s Used in Carrier Rocket Launch Tests [TASS 21 Jan]	19
U.S., Kazakhstan Discuss Arms Issues	19
Legislative Delegations Meet [S. Skorokhodov; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 23 Jan]	19
Talks With Bartholomew on START [A. Ladin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 23 Jan]	19
Quick Elimination of Nuclear Arsenal Urged [S. Blagovolin; IZVESTIYA 23 Jan]	20

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Lithuania's Landsbergis Continues Calls for Soviet Withdrawal	21
Seeks Commonwealth Help [Vilnius Radio 20 Dec]	21
Interviewed on Political Problems [Vilnius Radio 14 Jan]	22
'Still Unsolved Issue' [Vilnius Radio 17 Jan]	23
On Yeltsin Meeting [Vilnius Radio 18 Jan]	24
Reports on Issue of Soviet Troops in Estonia	24
Ruutel Statement on CIS Formation [Tallinn Radio 26 Dec]	24
Talks With Russian Foreign Minister [Radio Rossii 14 Jan]	25
Communique Issued [TASS 15 Jan]	25
Soviet Units Leave [IZVESTIYA 20 Jan]	25
51,358 USSR Army Personnel Stationed in Latvia [Riga Radio 27 Dec]	26
Baltic States Continue To Press for Soviet Troop Pullout	26
Baltic Council Issues Appeal [EKHO LITVY 7 Jan]	26
Garrison Commander on Need To Withdraw Troops [BALTFAX 10 Jan]	26
Latvia's Gorbunovs Asks Western Aid [Riga Radio 22 Jan]	26
Official Interviewed Future of WGF Troops [Budapest NEPSZAVA 11 Jan]	27
Russian Statements on Reopening of Vienna Talks	27
Assumption of Soviet Obligations [V. Smelov; TASS 13 Jan]	27
Reassures CFE Participants [V. Smelov; TASS 16 Jan]	27
Delegate Cited on Personnel Reductions [V. Smelov; TASS 23 Jan]	28
Belarus 'in No Hurry' To Increase Military [A. Gureskiy; Moscow TV 13 Jan]	28
TASS Cites FRG's Genscher on CFE, CSBM Talks [M. Stepovik; 13 Jan]	28
NACC Members Confer on CFE Implementation [V. Peresada; PRAVDA 14 Jan]	29
Controversy With Poland Over Troop Withdrawal Pace	29
CIS Spokesman Denies Polish Report [A. Naryshkin; TASS 15 Jan]	29
Ambassador, Polish Official Cited [M. Malchun; TASS 21 Jan]	30
Commentaries on U.S. Troop Withdrawals From Europe	30
End of Cold War Confirmed [N. Kalintsev; TASS 17 Jan]	30
U.S., Soviet Withdrawals Compared [V. Solovyev; Moscow Radio 18 Jan]	31
Russia Seeks To Sell Tanks Withdrawn From Europe [Moscow TV 20 Jan]	31

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Russian Delegate on Nuclear, Chemical Arms' Elimination [Moscow Radio 14 Jan]	31
---	----

NUCLEAR TESTING

Allegations of 1986 Test in Ukraine [SAMOSTIYNA UKRAYINA No 20, Dec 91]	32
---	----

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Controversy Over Secret Aral Sea BW Test Site	33
'Bombshell' in Kazakh Parliament [Moscow Radio 13 Jan]	33
Resolution Orders Closure [KOMSSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 24 Jan]	33

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Delegations Question CIS Nuclear Security [A. Krivopalov, A. Sychev; IZVESTIYA 13 Jan]	33
Western Concerns Over Republics' Nuclear Role Viewed	34
U.S. Concerns on START Implementation [Yu. Solton; Moscow Radio 13 Jan]	34
FRG, U.S. Differ on Tactical Arms [A. Sychev; IZVESTIYA 18 Jan]	35
Khasbulatov, Kissinger Discuss Russia's Nuclear Role [TASS 14 Jan]	35
Reports on Withdrawal of Nuclear Arms to Russia	36
Withdrawal From Ukraine [D. Anatolyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Jan]	36
Timetables for Tactical, Strategic Arms [INTERFAX 14 Jan]	36
Kozyrev: Tactical Weapons Out of Baltics [BALTFAX 16 Jan]	36
Naval Weapons From Ukraine [Kiev Radio 16 Jan]	36
Ukraine To Be Nuclear-Free by 2000 [TASS 17 Jan]	37
Progress Report on Ukraine [N. Zaika; TASS 22 Jan]	37
NRRC Commander Rules Out Nuclear Misuse [V. Medvedev; Prague RUDE PRAVO 17 Jan]	37

WEST EUROPE

GERMANY

Leaders Assess Bush's 'Drastic' Arms Reductions	39
Kohl Comments [ADN 29 Jan]	39
Genscher Comments [DPA 29 Jan]	39

UNITED KINGDOM

Major Comments on Bush's 'Imaginative Initiative'	39
UK Policy on Trident SSBN's [PRESS ASSOCIATION 29 Jan]	39
Remarks on Yeltsin's Response [C. Moncrieff; PRESS ASSOCIATION 29 Jan]	39
Defense Secretary Comments [C. Miller; PRESS ASSOCIATION 29 Jan]	40

Koreas Exchange Copies of Non-Nuclear Accord

OW2101164092 Beijing XINHUA in English
1526 GMT 21 Jan 92

[Text] Pyongyang, January 21 (XINHUA)—Delegates from both sides of Korea exchanged signed copies of a non-nuclear accord at Panmunjom today, completing procedures for "The Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

The accord, signed by respective prime ministers, will come into effect after the sixth round of inter Korean high-level talks to be held in Pyongyang February 18 to 21.

The exchange was made in the conference room of the neutral nations supervisory commission at the border village.

The accord bans the two sides of Korea from testing, producing, possessing and deploying nuclear weapons on their territories.

Both sides agreed to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and refrain from possessing nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.

They also agreed to allow inspection of objects chosen by the other side through procedures and methods defined by the North-South Joint Committee of Nuclear Control.

According to the accord, the two sides will form and operate the North-South Joint Committee of Nuclear Control within one month after the publication of the joint declaration.

A report from the KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY quoted Choe U-chin, a delegate from the North side as saying the joint declaration came a result of the anti-nuclear peace policy consistently maintained by the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

He said the joint declaration was a "historical document" in that it removed the danger of nuclear war from the Korean Peninsula and contributed to peace and security in Asia and the world.

It had epochal significance in creating a favorable precondition for the peaceful reunification of the Korean nation, he added.

The non-nuclear agreement, along with a reconciliation accord signed on December 13, is seen by observers as the key to peace on the peninsula.

XINHUA Notes U.S. ABM Treaty 'Abandonment'

OW2701071592 Beijing XINHUA in English
0650 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] Washington, January 26 (XINHUA)—The Bush Administration has taken a step leading to abandonment of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty, the WASHINGTON POST reported today.

The administration has omitted the 1972 accord from a list of major, existing arms control accords it is telling the former Soviet republics they should adhere to, the newspaper quoted U.S. officials as saying.

The omission is the first step in a new Pentagon-led effort to junk the treaty by capitalizing on legal uncertainties surrounding past U.S.-Soviet pacts, the officials said.

Because it bars wide-spread deployment of ballistic missile defense systems on the ground, abm treaty is viewed as an obstacle to the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the first phase which is expected to be deployed in 1996.

The officials said that when Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew and other U.S. officials met leaders of the former Soviet republics last week, they sought only the republics' adherence to provisions of the recently signed strategic arms reduction treaty and the 1990 conventional forces in European treaty.

But another official was quoted as saying that the Bush administration was not going to totally abandon, but to alter the ABM Treaty and intend to try in coming months to persuade the former Soviet republics to agree to new treaty terms.

The SDI program spending is expected to enjoy at least one billion dollar increase in the fiscal 1993, to reach a total budget of more than five billion dollars, the WASHINGTON POST said.

The administration has said the SDI program, conceived in the peak of the cold war, is still needed to counter growing threat of missile proliferation.

But critics said that dangers to the United States are overblown by the Pentagon and that too much of SDI program is being spent on defenses against long-range, rather than short-range, missile attack, the POST said.

It quoted one SDI opponent as saying that "it would be immensely foolish to waste untold billions of dollars for a questionable defense against a nonexistent threat."

With regard to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the Ministry hopes, in principle, to set up a permanent inspecting body in each half of the divided peninsula. Initially, however, it wants to establish an on-site inspection system following what it called a pilot inspection.

Reporting on major policy goals for this year to President No Tae-u at the Ministry Tuesday morning, Defense Minister Choe Sae-chang said he would selectively strengthen the war-fighting potential of the armed forces, which is expected to be weakened, in part, by the disbanding of the Korean-U.S. Combined Forces Command.

Choe said the government would appoint a four-star general as commander of the ground component command as the United States is scheduled to transfer the command to South Korea before the end of the year.

The government will meet one-third of the cost incurred by the U.S. troops by 1995, assuming the cost of keeping U.S. troops in South Korea in 1993 is the same level as that of 1991, the minister said.

As for the U.S. military golf course in the Yongsan base, scheduled to return to Korea in June, Choe said his Ministry hoped to build a public park there by the end of the year.

Choe said the government did not plan to review an earlier agreement with the United States to suspend a withdrawal of any more U.S. troops from South Korea unless and until North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons development program and resolves other nuclear-related issues.

POLAND

'Caution' Urged on Russian Troop Withdrawal Promises

LD2101171292 Warsaw PAP in English 1609 GMT
21 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 21—Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Poland Yuriy Kashlev stated on Tuesday [21 January] that November 15 was the binding date for the withdrawal of combat units of the Northern Group of the former Soviet Army from Poland.

"So far things have been going on according to the timetable," he said.

The ambassador added that in 1991 over 10,000 soldiers of the Northern Group had been withdrawn from Poland, pointing out that Polish mass media tend to diminish this figure. However, Col. Stefan Golebiowski, press spokesman for the Polish Government plenipotentiary for Soviet troops stationed in this country, estimated that 4,300 Northern Group soldiers had left Poland last year.

He said that additional 6,000 mentioned by Kashlev might have left this country by air.

He recommended a cautious approach to statements by the Russian side, adding that the Soviet side has never released reports on numerical levels of troops stationed and withdrawn from Poland as well as never presented a pull out timetable.

CIS Commander's Comments on Withdrawal Talks Criticized

Polish General Comments

LD2601201892 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 1830 GMT 26 Jan 92

[Excerpts] All combat units belonging to the Northern Group of the Soviet Armed Forces will have left Poland by 15 November, General Viktor Dubynin announced at a news conference in Legnica. A group of 6,000 men supervising the transit of the Soviet armed forces will have left by the end of the next year. General Dubynin assured that deadlines for the withdrawal of the Northern Group of the armed forces will be kept even if the Polish side does not sign an agreement on the principles and manner of withdrawal of the forces.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] [passage omitted] An unexpected summing up to the day was the news conference organized by General Dubynin in which he unexpectedly and sharply attacked the representatives of the Polish authorities for, as he stated, delaying the progress in negotiations concerning the withdrawal of the Northern Group from Poland as well as misleading the public by scaling down the figures on the size of the withdrawal.

[?Major General Zdzislaw Ostrowski] We do not have customs outposts at the airports which are being used by the Soviet Army. Therefore, my apologies to the bishop, but I am not a holy spirit, and I do not know how many soldiers were withdrawn by planes. [sentence as heard] I am simply astonished at what has happened here. Therefore, I state once again: I am willing to initiate good-neighborly, friendly talks with General Dubynin. This is my aim, but I will not allow untruths to be told about the Polish Government. [end recording]

Spokesman Comments Further

LD2701171292 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network
in Polish 1510 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] A small storm has blown up around the Soviet forces stationed in Poland. General Dubynin has accused the Polish side, and Lieutenant General Zdzislaw Ostrowski, the government plenipotentiary for the stay of Soviet troops in Poland, personally, of delaying the deadline for signing an agreement on the settlement of financial accounts between the Polish Government and the Northern Group of Soviet Army forces. Here is Marcin Gugulski, the government press spokesman, speaking on this matter:

[Begin Gugulski recording] In his statement yesterday, 26 January, Colonel General Viktor Dubynin, commander of the Northern Group of forces of the former USSR, was completely at variance with the truth in accusing the Polish Government of responsibility for the delay in the signing of the agreement on the withdrawal of the forces of the former USSR in Poland. The Polish Government had already presented the USSR Government with a draft of such an agreement in 1990, and was then ready to sign it immediately. The cause of the delay was not to be found on the Polish side. Last year, the initialing of the agreement came about at the initiative of the Polish side. On the matter of the financial settlement of accounts, the Polish Government proposed the adoption of the so-called zero option—that is, the forsaking of mutual claims consequent upon the takeover of sites or damage caused—but the Soviet Government rejected this straightforward solution, thereby calling forth long and difficult negotiations regarding financial settlements. Not for the first time, facts in the statement by General Dubynin are untrue and lead to polemics and harm the atmosphere of the negotiations. General Dubynin ought to desist from speaking on matters that are not within his remit. Despite this, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is convinced that the negotiations regarding financial settlements, which now find themselves in their final stages, will lead to a result that is favorable to both sides. The matter of the quick withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland should be urgently settled.

To these fragments of the clarification by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman I wish to add a few sentences by way of comment, a comment relating to certain other statements by General Dubynin. This is not a comment

on all of his statements, only to those on a few matters. General Dubynin spoke of a delay in coming to an agreement, he accused the Polish side of this delay, which is completely at variance with the truth. As there is talk of delays then, indeed, if someone is delaying then it is the Russian, the Soviet side that is delaying the regulation of payments. These are not small amounts. Here 25,914,000 Swiss francs are involved, for the transport of forces. Here 33,817,000,000 zloties are involved for rent, \$1,973,000 for electricity, and, finally, \$3,625,000 for food. As regards electricity, there are problems of a purely technical and organizational nature. It is clear that if someone does not pay for electricity the normal procedure that is then considered is the cutting off of the supply to such a consumer. Regarding food supplies, General Dubynin allowed himself to state that his country fed Poland after the Second World War—that anyway is how the press and press agencies cited it. Well, the facts state otherwise. A discussion after half a century is a discussion that is in part at least historical. I will not renew it here and now. One can only state that, indeed,

once, long ago, a very long time ago, Russia was an exporter of food. Recently, rather not. It has rather been an importer, or has even taken advantage of foreign assistance.

On the other hand, this situation with which we are dealing in Poland in association with the stay of Soviet forces that are not paying for the food they receive is something completely different. In the Polish language, for the specification of such a situation in which one side supplies required goods and the other does not pay for these goods, we do not use either the names import or assistance. We have completely different words for this. [end recording]

From the calculations of Marcin Gugulski it transpires that the Russians owe us around \$13 million. Slawomir Mrozek [well-known satirist] once wrote this amusing sentence: As the NOVOSTI agency reports, God does not exist. Logically, the statement by General Dubynin is of the same standard.

GENERAL

Academician Ponders CIS Nuclear Future, Treaties

PM1401162192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 7

[Article by Academician Vitaliy Goldanskiy, member of the leadership of the International Pugwash Movement: "The World Wants Clarity and Reliability When it Comes to the Former USSR's Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Perhaps no other question perturbs people in all continents more than the fate of the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. The BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, which comes out in the United States, carries on its cover a symbolic clock with its hands approaching midnight. After the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles was concluded, the clock's hands were put back from 2357 to 2353 hours, and since April 1990 they have stood at 2350 hours. It seemed that after the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on Reducing and Limiting Strategic Offensive Weapons was signed 31 July 1991, it would have been possible to boldly put the hands even further back. But new, unforeseen, and very serious threats presented themselves to the world at this juncture, coming this time exclusively from our side which was armed not just to the teeth but literally from head to toe....

Only Russia Has the Right to Remain a Nuclear Power in the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]

At first, during the three days of the August putsch, it was not clear into whose hands the "nuclear button" had fallen, and whether it had fallen into the plotters' hands. And there was reason to fear—it is sufficient to reread the pre-putsch press statements by scientists and high-ranking officials who have linked their fate with the military-industrial complex, as well as the August junta's very first diplomatic documents.

Now the world is again alarmed, although this is for another reason—to this day there is no sufficient clarity in the distribution of the former Soviet Union's functions among the CIS member countries with nuclear weapons on their territory.

Russia has been recognized as the USSR's legal successor in its capacity as a permanent member of the UN Security Council with the power of veto. I think that it is necessary to determine as soon as possible Russia's similar capacity in the two most important international treaties offering fundamental guarantees against the threat of nuclear war. These are the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Under both these treaties the USSR—together with the United States and Britain—was one of three depository countries (which keep the ratification documents), with the right to veto any amendments.

The number of countries participating in the Non-Proliferation Treaty had reached 141 by the beginning of 1991; France and China joined last year. This treaty clearly formulates the rights and obligations of two categories of country—nuclear and nonnuclear ones—whereby the nuclear ones are defined as those which had manufactured and exploded nuclear devices prior to 1 January 1967. There were five such countries—the United States (1945), the USSR (1949), Britain (1952), France (1960), and China (1964). Now, out of all CIS member countries, only Russia has the right to claim the title of a nuclear country. Although all Soviet nuclear tests in the first five years (1949-1954) were carried out only in Kazakhstan, the manufacture of nuclear weapons remains a Russian monopoly.

I consider it a matter of urgency to officially register the transfer to Russia of all the USSR's rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and to have all the remaining CIS member countries become parties to this document as nonnuclear countries. Let me remark that, under Article 5 of the relevant Alma-Ata document of 21 December 1991, Ukraine and Belarus, but not Kazakhstan, pledged to join in such a capacity.

The United States and Britain May Review Their Stand on Nuclear Tests

The importance of legally defining the future status of our nuclear weapons is so enormous, that it would probably be worth thinking about the possibility of urgently convening an extraordinary conference of the countries which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (there is a provision that such conferences be regularly convened once every five years, and the treaty's future fate is due to be determined in 1995). Moreover, such an extraordinary conference could resolve or at least raise once again, and this time with particular force, one more question—that of a complete ban on nuclear tests.

The point is that it would be possible to enshrine a complete ban in law as an amendment to the 1963 Treaty—and to add a fourth environment in which tests are banned to the three already mentioned in it—under ground. There are 118 countries which today are parties to the 1963 Treaty, of which 104 have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would be enough to get initiatives from (or the agreement of) 60 countries which are parties to it, to convene a conference to examine amendments to the 1963 Treaty—and this is perfectly feasible. True, the United States or (and) Britain may well and truly block the adoption of an amendment ensuring a complete ban on nuclear tests using their veto. But in the current international situation these countries may seriously review their unbending positions with regard to a complete ban on nuclear tests. I think that the political gain for the United States and Britain from an agreement on such a ban would far outweigh the rather arguable technical arguments in favor of continuing tests. If the United States continues to insist on their

continuation, I can only repeat the proposal which I have already made in the pages of *IZVESTIYA* (No. 311, 1990)—let us carry out not only U.S. and British nuclear tests in Nevada, but Russian ones as well.

Incidentally, broad scientific and technical cooperation between U.S. and Russian nuclear scientists, their joint activities to resolve the most important problems of fundamental science where the experience accumulated in both countries and the unique equipment of the leading nuclear centers may play an invaluable role, could offer the most reliable protection from the threat of our highly qualified specialists leaving for countries like Iraq and Libya.

The Way To Eliminate Tactical Nuclear Weapons

To conclude—something on perhaps the most real threat contained in our tactical nuclear weapons, which may even be put in operation without the knowledge of the leaderships of the CIS countries or of the Armed Forces, and which lend themselves far less easily to reliable monitoring, inventorying, and localization and may more easily get into irresponsible or even criminal hands. Even though a criminal may not be actually capable of setting off a nuclear explosion, the chemical explosion in the sheath surrounding each nuclear warhead will release highly toxic radioactive plutonium into the atmosphere in quantities of only three to four times less than Chernobyl.

We discussed the necessity to completely destroy tactical nuclear weapons together with U.S. scientists back in September 1991 in Beijing. The statement of the scientists' Pugwash Movement anticipated G. Bush's and M.S. Gorbachev's October initiatives and contained the following specific proposals:

1. Within one month the United States and the USSR (we would now say the CIS) declare the types, models, quantity, and location of all tactical nuclear warheads as well as the means to identify them (for example their code names and special numbers).

2. Storage buildings are designated and adapted for the supervised storage of all tactical nuclear warheads. The countries possessing nuclear weapons use all necessary means to ensure the safekeeping of the assembled weapons against any possible attacks on the places where they are stored. Permanent international supervision guarantees the weapons' safekeeping—so that they or their components are not moved clandestinely and the forces guarding them do not themselves become a threat to the weapons' safekeeping.

Within one to two months after the details of the tactical weapons' storehouses are announced, they should be transferred to these storehouses, which have been equipped with massive concrete screens, and each warhead should be encased and sealed up. When this period has expired, not a single tactical nuclear warhead should remain outside these supervised storehouses.

3. The nuclear warheads stored in the storehouses should be dismantled over a period of several years, and subsequently destroyed. It will be necessary to transport the weapons to supervised workshops where scrap metal, chemical explosive substances, and other combustible components, as well as crushed fissile materials, will be extracted.

As I was finishing this article, I heard about the meeting of the leaders of these five powers—permanent members of the UN Security Council—planned for the very near future. The main topic of the forthcoming meeting will be the fate of the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. Fine, let us wait and see.

U.S. 'Peace-Loving Intentions' Questioned

PM2001111192 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Rear Admiral V. Prozorov, chief of Navy General Staff section: "Is it Necessary to Increase in Order To Cut Back? The Disintegration of the USSR and Strategic Stability"]

[Text] President Bush's initiatives on tactical nuclear weapons were a surprise for our foreign policy department and Defense Ministry. In his 28 September interview with Central Television, President Gorbachev tried to claim otherwise, but the delay of more than a week in coming forward with our reciprocal measures and the superficial substantiation of these measures make this claim dubious.

Back in 1990 the USSR unilaterally declared the waters of the Baltic Sea and the air space above it a nuclear-free zone. We took the initiative in committing ourselves to removing nuclear weapons from the area. At the time this passed unnoticed by the world public, and the United States and other NATO countries did not reciprocate with any positive follow-up response. It is very likely that the United States was not ready to take reciprocal measures and this initiative by the USSR merely served as an impetus to the drawing up of proposals by the U.S. military-political leadership to cut back tactical nuclear weapons.

The absence of any reciprocal measures evidently cooled off our initiatives. The elaboration and substantiation of further steps were virtually curtailed.

What opportunities did we lose as a result of this—plenty. M. Gorbachev's counter proposals to Bush's initiatives contained no seemingly obvious ideas. Like declaring the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Seas nuclear-free zones, as well as the South Pacific Ocean (the "Rarotonga Treaty"). The implementation of measures such as these is completely realistic and would substantially strengthen stability in these regions. Moreover, the question of how U.S. military strategy will change as a result of the cutback in tactical nuclear weapons has also been passed over in silence.

Let us look at today's realities. The basic tenets of U.S. military doctrine have remained unchanged even taking the U.S. President's initiatives into account. Nor are they changing in the slightest following the disintegration of the USSR. In line with these tenets, the U.S. military-political leadership still believes nuclear weapons to be a deterrent element in peacetime, and the principal means of armed struggle in wartime. The United States continues to categorically reject a possible commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons.

Let us pause for a moment on this question. The commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons taken on by our country, if it were extended universally, would certainly reduce the danger of a nuclear cataclysm. These commitments should at some stage form a basis for global stability and collective security against nuclear threat for all states, both large and small. Alas, the USSR no longer exists, and who is going to insist on this position now? Russia? The Commonwealth? But will the new Commonwealth of States assume this function? Will anyone take it seriously?

The U.S. leadership has consented to sign an agreement on the elimination of medium- and short-range missiles stationed on European states' territory only when an appropriate number of U.S. surface warships and submarines have been fitted with Tomahawk cruise missiles. The reason is that in terms of nuclear equipment, these are capable of performing the same tasks that were assigned to the medium- and short-range missiles. The elimination of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons has also become possible because they have lost their significance, which cannot be said of air-launched missiles. These are not being cut back. On the contrary, it is envisaged to modernize them and their delivery systems. Having used the Persian Gulf war to test out the latest conventionally armed weapons, which are as effective as tactical nuclear weapons, the U.S. leadership deemed it possible to remove tactical nuclear weapons from warships, submarines, and naval aviation. Nor, incidentally, are these weapons being destroyed—they are being stored ready for use.

There is another aspect of the U.S. leadership's "peace-loving intentions." It is no secret that the United States is experiencing certain difficulties in financing the "SDI" program. It is not giving up this program and it is not going to give it up, even if we are left without a single nuclear warhead. The development [stroitelstvo] of the SDI program is a question of national prestige. A substitute is being applied today: Funds for space weapons systems are being obtained by cutting back expenditure on tactical weapons. Admittedly, there is the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of ABM defense systems dated 28 May 1972. This is like a chain fettering U.S. actions in the SDI sphere, with the technological basis for its deployment practically created [sozdana]. But we know that the United States adopts a fundamental attitude to anything: First, one of the parties to the treaty, as we can see, no longer exists, which means that the treaty is left hanging in the air.

Second, proposals for a nonnuclear ABM defense system already exist—the first stage of the SDI deployment.

In other words, today the United States' hands have practically been untied. Until the Commonwealth of Independent States defines its positions, it can achieve a lot. Moreover, the commonwealth is under control. This was demonstrated once again by J. Baker's tour of the independent states of the former Union.

Coordination Group To Eliminate Nuclear Arms

OW1701234392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1830 GMT 17 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian government decided to establish a coordinating group to work out, within a month's time, and submit a comprehensive program to eliminate nuclear arms. The group is led by the Russian Academy of Sciences vice president Yevgeniy Velikhov. The group includes Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy and Industry V. Mikhailov, S. Zelentsov, chief engineer of the 12th chief department of the Defense Ministry, V. Mashits, chairman of the Russian Federation's state committee for economic cooperation with the commonwealth members, and F. Shelov-Kovedayev, first Russian deputy foreign minister.

The Russian government also supported a proposal of the republican academy of sciences to establish an International Agency for the Liquidation of Nuclear Arms. The coordinating group was instructed to hold talks with the U.S. and other interested parties to set up such an agency.

START TALKS

Nazarkin Argues for START Treaty Approval

924F0050A Moscow MEZH DUNARODNAYA ZHIZN
in Russian No 1, Jan 92 (Signed to press 24 Dec 91)
pp 25-31

[Article by Yuriy Konstantinovich Nazarkin, ambassador at large of the USSR Ministry of External Relations, leader of the Soviet delegation for negotiations with the United States on nuclear and space weapons, 1989-1991: "A Treaty the World Needs (Toward Ratification of the Treaty on Restriction and Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons)"; the author wrote the article before the conference on 21 December 1991 in Alma-Ata of leaders of states that formed the Commonwealth of Independent States]

[Text] The preparations for the Strategic Arms Reduction [START] Treaty were lengthy and complicated. For a long time the stream of negotiations fought its way through the barriers left from the Cold War and confrontation until it became the torrent that carried the treaty to the point of signing. Even in the last stage of the

negotiations there were many difficulties causing the fate of the treaty to hang by a thread.

Debates about the treaty were conducted not only in the context of the negotiations but outside it as well—in the political spheres and on the pages of the press.

The criticism of the START Treaty began—both in the United States and in our country—long before this document began to assume real contours. Touching upon the most important and most sensitive part of the arms of both countries, it attracted the most constant attention—and even now, on the eve of its ratification, it is attracting even more.

Many times in connection with the treaty there has been a temptation to resort to criticism out of motives having to do with politics or even politicking. Suffice it to recall just the "15 questions for the minister who resigned" and other speeches by V. Alksnis, Ye. Kogan, and N. Petrushenko within the framework of that ignoble campaign which they staged at one time against E.A. Shevardnadze. O.D. Baklanov, former secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and now an inhabitant of Matrosskaya Tishina, spoke from positions close to these when he explained to us that "the only free cheese is in a mousetrap."

At the same time the majority of questions arising in connection with the treaty, reflecting a conscientious desire to figure out this exceptionally complicated document thoroughly and objectively, or, rather, this complex of documents (the treaty itself comes with more than 50 appendices, memoranda, statements, letters of transmittal, and so forth and so on—an overall volume of about 900 pages) can be reduced to the following:

- Did the Soviet side not make excessively large concessions to the United States and will the treaty not result in damage to our defense capability?
- Why is the treaty restricted to reducing strategic offensive weapons by only one-third? Why not go further right now?
- Will the treaty not lead to a situation where the reduction of the quantitative arms race will bring about a harder race in the area of improving arms?
- Will it not turn out that the fulfillment of the treaty will require expenditures that are greater than the economic gain?
- Is the treaty needed at all? Would it not be simpler, without any treaties, to reduce our strategic offensive weapons to the level of "minimal sufficiency" and let the Americans do as they wish?

These questions are not just arising now. They were taken into account during the course of the negotiations at which the treaty was developed.

And so, the treaty and our defense capability.

In keeping with the provisions of the treaty, after the reduction the sides are to have equal quantities of both carriers (1,600 units each) and warheads (6,000 units each). These identical levels for the two sides will provide for full parity. In practice, however, because of the rules agreed upon in the treaty for calculating the warheads for heavy bombers, the number of warheads the Americans would have could be greater by 2,000-2,500 units than what we would have. The problem is that, according to the treaty, all nuclear weapons except for long-distance air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), regardless of how many of them there may be for one heavy bomber, are counted as one warhead for this heavy bomber (this pertains to free-falling bombs and missiles with an effective distance of less than 600 kilometers). Of course, this rule applies equally to both the United States and us. But the American heavy bomber fleet is 3.5 times larger than ours. After the reductions under the agreement this ratio will change somewhat since the United States will apparently reduce the number of its heavy bombers by approximately one-third and it will be 1:2.36 (if we decide to increase the number of our heavy bombers, which we have the right to do).

This rule for counting warheads for heavy bombers was perhaps the largest concession from our side to the Americans in all the negotiations. Was this concession justified? In order to answer this question objectively, it is necessary to keep the following circumstances in mind.

In the first place, we must recall the conditions under which this concession was made. It was 1986. The Soviet leaders, having begun perestroika, were trying to break through the inertia of confrontation, which was still strongly in evidence in Soviet-American relations. Our agreement to the rules proposed by the Americans for counting warheads for heavy bombers became the real step which showed that the Soviet Union was sincerely and seriously striving for positive changes in the sphere of international relations as well.

In the second place, our agreement to count nuclear arms for heavy bombers which were not long-range air-launched cruise missiles per unit was conditioned by the agreement on the part of the American side to set the limit of distance for a long-range air-launched cruise missile at 600 kilometers (the United States initially set this limit at 1,500 kilometers). In practice this means that in order to use nuclear weapons at a distance of less than 600 kilometers the American heavy bombers would have to enter our air defense zone. Of course, under these conditions the effectiveness of these nuclear weapons becomes considerably less than that of the long-range air-launched cruise missiles. Moreover, the United States agreed not to base strategic nuclear weapons, including heavy bombers, outside its territory.

And, finally, in the third place—and this is perhaps the main thing—this concession of ours was compensated for by reciprocal concessions by the American side with respect to the kinds of strategic offensive weapons which

we have and the United States does not: They withdrew their demands for complete elimination of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and a complete ban on mobile ICBM's. As a result, we retained the right to keep 50 percent of our heavy ICBM's (154 instead of the existing 308). As for mobile ICBM's, a sublevel was set for them at 1,100 warheads for deployed missiles (as of 1 September 1990 for our deployed mobile ICBM's there were 618 warheads) and limits were also established for undeployed mobile equipment: 250 ICBM's, including 125 for mobile rail ICBM launchers and 110 launchers, including 18 rail launchers. In addition to these restrictions, certain additional kinds of control for ICBM's, taking their mobility into account, were also agreed upon, but nonetheless this kind of our strategic offensive weapons remained in service, and we cannot but reduce them.

When it comes to concessions from the Soviet side to the Americans, people usually mention the linkage between the strategic offensive weapons reduction and the problem of antimissile defense (ABM). At the same time there is the fear that the reduction of strategic offensive weapons by the Soviet side, in the event that the United States develops antimissile defense—in keeping with the "Strategic Defense Initiative" [SDI]—could lead to a change in the strategic alignment of forces in favor of the United States and cause harm to our country's security.

The view of the START Treaty in the context of the general strategic alignment of forces, which determines both offensive and defensive capabilities, is undoubtedly justified. Moreover, it is necessary. So, what is the present situation and what are the prospects?

At the present time neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has an antimissile defense system which would affect the strategic alignment of forces. Moreover, the ABM Treaty prohibits the creation of such systems (as an exception we are allowed to station only one ABM system with a radius of 150 kilometers in each region). The implementation of the Star Wars Program, which remains in the stage of research and development, has not crossed over the boundary where it would begin to violate the ABM Treaty, although the actions of the United States have aroused our concern in a number of cases. Such is the situation as of the present day.

As for the future, the potential for the development by the United States of a strategic antimissile defense system in violation of the ABM Treaty, unfortunately, is still there. Therefore this question is quite understandable: When concluding the agreement on a significant reduction of strategic offensive weapons, did we take into account the interconnection between offensive and defensive systems?

Throughout the negotiations during which the START Treaty was developed, the Soviet side, when determining the possible depth of the cuts in strategic offensive weapons, and especially reductions and limitations on

heavy ICBM's, proceeded from the "worst possible scenario," although the position of the Soviet Union with respect to linking reductions of strategic offensive weapons to restrictions on antimissile defense systems went through a certain evolution.

Until September 1989 as a preliminary condition for the signing of the START Treaty the Soviet side insisted on solving the problem of antimissile defense system and space. This meant that in connection with the research and development on the SDI Program being undertaken in the United States, which includes a space component, the Soviet Union wanted to obtain additional guarantees that the United States would not violate the ABM Treaty and would not withdraw from it. By September 1989 it was clear that this kind of linkage would create an impasse, since the conclusion of the START Treaty was being blocked because of the impossibility of obtaining such guarantees. At the same time the SDI Program, after the euphoria of 1983-1986, entered a stage of revision of its initial concept.

In the first place, it became clear that regardless of how tempting it was to create an "absolute shield" which would transform nuclear weapons into "unnecessary and obsolete" trash, this was no less of a utopia than the creation of the eternal engine.

In the second place, it became clear that the development of a considerably more modest antimissile defense system involved considerably greater technical difficulties and financial expenditures than was anticipated.

In the third place, a radical change in the political situation in the world and the gradual transition from confrontation to more peaceful forms of intergovernmental communication cooled off many hot heads in the United States who intended "not to worry about the cost" in order to create an "antinuclear shield." A significant role in this process of normalization of the international situation was played by the conclusion of the Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles [INF Treaty] and the successful continuation of Soviet-American negotiations with the purpose of preparing for the START Treaty.

Here are the dynamics of the budget allocations allotted by the U.S. Congress for the SDI Program (for fiscal years in billions of dollars): 1984—1.0; 1985—1.6; 1986—2.75; 1987—3.8; 1988—3.9; 1989—4.1; 1990—3.8; 1991—2.9.

The 1.5-fold increases during 1984-1987 are replaced in 1988 by an insignificant increase in allocations (recall that the INF Treaty was signed in December 1987) and in 1989 the amounts of allocations begin to decrease appreciably.

Under these conditions the Soviet Union made a decision not to link the conclusion of the START Treaty to any preliminary conditions. This decision stimulated the work on the treaty and brought closer the prospects for

reduction of strategic offense weapons and, correspondingly, contributed to the growth in the United States of the understanding that the SDI was not necessary.

The Soviet Union's withdrawal of its demand for additional guarantees of the observance by the United States of the ABM Treaty in no way meant ignoring the connection between offensive and defensive arms. The START Treaty could be effective and viable only under the conditions of the observance of the Treaty between the USSR and United States on Limitation of Anti-Missile Defense Systems in the form in which it was signed on 26 May 1972. We stated this to the Americans quite clearly. And not only that. The fact is that the START Treaty contains a special provision on the right to withdraw from it. "Each of the sides, by way of exercising its state sovereignty," it says in Point 3 of Article XVII, "has the right to withdraw from the present treaty if it decides that exceptional circumstances related to the present treaty have threatened its highest interests." It was officially stated to Washington that these exceptional circumstances also include circumstances arising in connection with the withdrawal of one of the parties from the ABM Treaty or in connection with a significant violation of it.

On 27 September 1991 U.S. President G. Bush called for the Soviet leaders, in conjunction with the United States, to take concrete steps toward allowing limited development of nonnuclear means of defense for protection from limited nuclear strikes, wherever they may come from, without undermining the credibility of existing forces for restraint. This had to do with the creation of so-called global protection from limited strikes. This system, which includes both space and ground components, could intercept up to 200 warheads. Although, of course, this new system appears considerably more modest than the initial SDI, its implementation would mean a violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

The Americans recognize that the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty prohibits many measures which are required for the creation of global protection from limited strikes. They think that in order to remove these prohibitions it is necessary to change the 1972 treaty. But changing it, of course, requires the consent of the other side.

In M.S. Gorbachev's response on 5 October 1991 he expressed a readiness to consider the American proposal about nonnuclear antimissile defense systems.

Such is the situation as of the present day. In any case our statement about the right to withdraw from the START treaty if the other side withdraws from the ABM Treaty or if, because of significant violation of it, the other side makes it necessary for us to prevent harm to our security. How will events develop in practice in connection with M.S. Gorbachev's announced readiness to discuss the American proposal is a question of exceptional importance. But that is a different subject.

Now about the depth of the cuts envisioned by the treaty. Are they not too small? Has life not gotten ahead of the negotiations? Obviously, the basis for these questions could be M.S. Gorbachev's statement concerning the decision to reduce the number of warheads on strategic weapons not to 6,000 units, as was stipulated by the treaty, but to 5,000 units. But it is hardly possible to consider it a shortcoming of the treaty that on its basis it is possible to take unilateral actions leading to deeper cuts in strategic offensive weapons. This is rather a plus of the treaty, since it creates the necessary confidence that with deep cuts the security of the side making them will not suffer.

Now about the possibility of qualitative improvement of strategic offensive weapons.

The treaty envisions significant restrictions in this area. There is a ban on new kinds of strategic offensive weapons that are known but have not become a reality ("air-ground" ballistic missiles, nuclear air-based cruise missiles with reentry vehicles). A procedure is envisioned for preventing the appearance in the future of kinds of strategic offensive weapons that are not known today. It is forbidden to create heavy submarine-launched ballistic missiles, heavy mobile ICBM's, or the new type of heavy siloed ICBM's. The number of warheads on ballistic missiles is limited (10 units). Means of rapid reload of ballistic missile launchers are prohibited.

The treaty does not fully prohibit modernization (that is, improvement within the limits of the existing type), although it limits it (in the event of the modernization of a ballistic missile its launched weight must not exceed 21 percent of the initial launched weight). Why not prohibit it completely? In the first place, modernization of a weapon certainly does not necessarily mean giving it more destructive properties. As a result of modernization it is possible to achieve both a reduction of the cost ratio (that is, a reduction of production and operating costs per unit of effectiveness) and an increase in the safety of the weapon, that is, improvement of its qualities which prevent accidental or unsanctioned use. Moreover, if a certain type of weapon is preserved, it is simply impossible to prohibit its modernization since it is impossible to prohibit technical progress. As long as a certain particular type, say, a ballistic missile, is retained, there is also a need to replace this type of missile as it becomes outdated (each missile has its own life span, after which it must be destroyed for otherwise it will become a source of danger). But in 10 years (this is the approximate life span of a missile) industry will not be able to produce an exact copy of it since technology will have gone forward. Even if one succeeded in artificially preserving it, this would lead to great economic losses.

There is no doubt that the economic aspect of the matter is very important: What material gain would be achieved as a result of implementation of the treaty and what expenditures would be required to fulfill it?

The procedures for reequipping or eliminating strategic offensive weapons were developed in such a way as, on the one hand, to preclude the restoration of the reequipped or eliminated means, and, on the other, to provide for the possibility of taking maximum advantage not only of the reequipped but also the eliminated means for national economic purposes. Thus with respect to mobile ICBM launchers, the sides agreed that, without destroying the entire self-propelled chassis, they would cut off the part of it behind the rear axle (no less than 0.78 meters) to which are attached the support devices necessary for launching it. This severed piece is then cut again into two approximately equal parts. As a result, the chassis can be used as a peacetime means of transportation and at the same time it cannot be restored to be used as a mobile launcher. As for the missiles for the mobile launchers, before they are destroyed it is permitted to remove electronic and electromechanical equipment, guidance and control systems, and various auxiliary equipment from the missile. Siloed ICBM's and also submarine-launched ballistic missiles are eliminated by each side, the procedures being left up to their discretion. It is allowed to use ballistic missiles for space launches for peaceful purposes. We may also conduct these launches in order to put satellites of third countries into orbit. Unfortunately, however, there are still COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] restrictions which keep many countries from launching their own satellites with the help of Soviet missiles.

The parties, also at their own discretion, dispose of the nuclear warheads removed from the weapons. In this connection there arises the possibility of using the fissionable materials contained in these warheads, after the appropriate processing, as fuel for nuclear power plants.

The reduction of strategic offensive weapons will make it possible to reduce the number of personnel employed for servicing the corresponding equipment and facilities and to reduce the production of strategic offensive weapons intended for replacing obsolete arms. As a result of the fulfillment of the treaty, obviously, it will be possible to reduce the amounts spent on scientific research and experimental design work for creating new kinds, types, and modifications of strategic weapons. Actually, the treaty is already producing an economic effect: As was announced on 5 October 1991, the Soviet Union is terminating the development of two missiles—modified short-range nuclear missiles for heavy bomber and mobile small-scale ICBM's.

Thus the fulfillment of the ABM Treaty expands the possibilities of stepping up the process of conversion of the defense industry without damaging our defense capabilities.

Is it possible at this time to determine the economic effect from the fulfillment of the START Treaty in terms of any specific figures, however approximate? This is an extraordinarily difficult if not impossible task, not only because of the complicated calculations but mainly

because of the fact that it is possible to fulfill in various ways the provisions of the treaty on reequipping and eliminating strategic offensive weapons and also to take advantage of the possibilities that arise in various ways. If we work efficiently, the gain will be very large. But if we approach this matter in a bureaucratic, slipshod way, to which, unfortunately, we are already accustomed, the result will be different.

The fulfillment of the START Treaty requires expenditures as well, of course. But we should not exaggerate them.

Of course, it will take money to eliminate or reequip the ICBM and SLBM launchers. But here one must take into account that this in itself will save money on their operation. As for the missiles, they must be destroyed regardless of the treaty—as they become worn out and obsolete.

Another cost item is control. With the ultra-detailed system of verification envisioned by the treaty, these costs could be considerable. But is it necessary to fully use absolutely all the kinds of control envisioned by the treaty? After all, the monitoring system was developed at a time when Soviet-American relations were so filled with suspicion that when developing verification procedures the parties created a monitoring mechanism with an extremely high degree of reliability. Will it now be necessary to implement this system of excessive insurance by 100 percent? After all, each party is deciding for itself whether or not to take advantage of the right to conduct one inspection or another. Within the framework of the established limits it also determines the number of inspectors to send: more than a certain number are not allowed, but less—go ahead¹.

Thus the economic gain from the treaty and the costs of implementing it will depend on how one side or the other deals with the opportunities contained in the treaty. If the approach is reasonable, the gain could be many times greater than the costs.

Under the conditions of the decline of former Union ties, it becomes exceptionally important to coordinate actions both for eliminating and reequipping strategic offensive weapons and for monitoring.

Finally, would it not be simpler to carry out the reduction unilaterally than to conduct lengthy negotiations in order to work out an agreement? Recent counter-initiatives of the Soviet and American presidents show that the time has come for unilateral actions in the area of disarmament as well. But these actions augment and do not replace what has already been achieved. Putting the START Treaty into force will make it possible not only to make the cuts envisioned by it but also to proceed to additional measures of a unilateral nature for further reduction of the nuclear threat. It would seem that the most effective path to further reducing strategic weapons and strengthening strategic stability would be a combination of unilateral and negotiated actions.

And so, in connection with the ratification of the treaty there arises not only the question of what it is itself but also of how it will be implemented in practice taking into account the new political and economic realities, and there is also the question of actions for further reduction of strategic weapons.

The START Treaty is the largest contribution to bringing relations between the USSR and United States in the military area into line with their level and quality in other areas. It will expand and reinforce those positive changes in international relations which have been taking place in the world for the past several years.

The conclusion of the START Treaty is not only a significant step in the reduction of the military confrontation and the threat of nuclear conflict but also a large breakthrough in the thinking and behavior of the two parties. The treaty will undoubtedly work for further reduction of efforts in the area of strategic weapons—both offensive and defensive weapons.

At the end of November 1991 the U.S. President sent the treaty to the Senate. They are studying it now. Actions for the actual ratification will apparently begin in January of this year, after the Christmas holidays.

In the Treaty on Joint Measures Regarding Nuclear Weapons signed on 21 December 1991 in Alma-Ata by the presidents of four states that are former Union republics where strategic offensive weapons are located there is a special article according to which the governments of Belarus, Kazakhstan, RSFSR, and Ukraine are committed to submit the START Treaty to the Supreme Soviets of their states for ratification.

Footnote

1. For the majority of inspections the limit is set at 10 people, and with noncontinuous observation—30 people, with the possibility of increasing the number to 45 temporarily.

COPYRIGHT: Mezhdunarodnaya assotsiatsiya "Znaniye". "Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn", 1992.

Kozyrev, Bartholomew Hold Disarmament Talks

Discuss Nuclear Arms Elimination, CIS Control

LD1701184692 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1628 GMT 17 Jan 92

[Text] Moscow, 17 Jan (TASS)—Andrey Kozyrev, minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, today received Reginald Bartholomew, U.S. first under secretary of state who is in Moscow for consultations on a range of topical issues dealing with nuclear disarmament and security.

During their conversation there was discussion of ways of extending Russian-American cooperation on the

problems of ensuring nuclear security and the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. There was an exchange of views on the existing system of nuclear arms control. A broad area was noted in which the positions of the sides coincide on the above-mentioned problems.

On the American side, particular note was made in a positive manner of the way in which the Commonwealth participant states are tackling the problems of single control of nuclear weapons, compliance with international arms limitation and disarmament accords, and ensuring a single military-strategic space.

Mutual satisfaction was expressed with the outcome of the consultations, in which a broad spectrum of authoritative specialists from both sides took part. The results of the informative and open exchange of views facilitate active cooperation between the United States and Russia in destroying nuclear munitions and in the safe handling of nuclear weapons. This means, in essence, a shift to a new quality in Russo-American relations—from the previous rigid and essentially confrontational parity in the military sphere, to parity in parallel and joint efforts to implement measures to strengthen strategic stability and to cut back superfluous military structures.

During the conversation, attention was paid to certain aspects of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's upcoming departure for the New York summit of UN Security Council heads of state, and also to his working meeting with the U.S. President.

Discuss Army Stabilization

LD1701184892 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1530 GMT 17 Jan 92

[Text] Control over nuclear weapons, their nonproliferation, prospects for arms cuts, and fulfillment of agreements reached in this area—these questions were at the center of attention at a meeting that took place today between Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Reginald Bartholomew, first U.S. under secretary of state.

The meeting took place after the completion of Russian-American consultations on disarmament problems, which lasted three days. I can state with satisfaction that significant progress has been reached on these questions, something which I will report in Washington, said Reginald Bartholomew after the meeting ended. He also expressed satisfaction over the decisions adopted by leaders of independent states in Minsk in this sphere, and he stated that they are moving the process in the right direction.

In his turn the Russian Minister noted that the talks have a bearing on preparations for the upcoming trip, at the end of January, to Washington by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. We think, he said, that this meets our interests.

Andrey Kozyrev also pointed to the need for stabilization in the Army after which, in his view, one will be able to advance along the road of reforming it and reducing military expenditure.

Describing the level of mutual understanding with the American side on these questions, the leader of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that there is a feeling of partnership, and I think that we can go gradually from partnership to friendly relations.

Reports, Comments on SS-19 ICBM Launch From Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Statement

LD2101225392 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2035 GMT 21 Jan 92

[By KAZTAG correspondent Gennadiy Kulagin]

[Text] Alma-Ata, 21 Jan (TASS)—The Kazakhstan president's press service distributed a statement here today in connection with the report published in IZVESTIYA about the alleged launching from the territory of the republic of an SS-19 ballistic missile.

"On 20 December 1991 at Baykonur cosmodrome," it says, "a Rokot space rocket was launched. This was undertaken for scientific purposes under the conversion program. Consequently, reports about the testing of a ballistic missile for military purposes is not in accord with reality.

"Because no mutually acceptable approaches have been worked out among the Commonwealth of Independent States members regarding the Armed Forces, including the use of the space testing facility, and because on 20 December 1991 no final decision yet existed on forming the Commonwealth, it is unnecessary to dramatize each instance of test launches of space technology," the statement stresses. "At the same time, Kazakhstan is aware that questions of the control of the former USSR's nuclear potential have indeed come to a head. However, they should be resolved without confrontation with the space and defense departments in a process of negotiations and of adopting mutually acceptable agreements.

"The position of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev on military questions and the use of space technology is well known. It is this: preservation of the joint Armed Forces, control of nuclear weapons from a single center, dual subordination of general purpose forces, use of the Baykonur cosmodrome and the Kurchatov scientific center for the common benefit of all states of the Commonwealth. All of these questions must be resolved stage by stage and without haste in order to prevent chaos and disorder in the process [words indistinct].

The Kazakhstan president's press service considers it "inadmissible for any form of pressure to be brought to bear against an independent state, including on this

question, such as can be clearly seen in certain press reports both abroad and within the Commonwealth."

Raises Doubts Over Control

PM2001163692 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Vladimir Nadein report: "Moscow Launches Missile From Kazakhstan, But Notifies Washington, Not Alma-Ata"]

[Text] Two days after the closure of the All-Army Officers Assembly, an episode occurred which will attract attention both outside the Commonwealth of Independent States and, most importantly, among the governments of the newly emerged independent states. I am talking about the launch of an SS-19 ballistic missile from the territory of Kazakhstan 20 December, the first report of which was published in THE WASHINGTON POST the other day.

THE WASHINGTON POST commentators Evans and Novak published an article on the problem of control of nuclear arms in the former Soviet republics. It says, in particular: "The White House believes that a test launch of an SS-19 ICBM capable of carrying six nuclear warheads took place in the new independent state of Kazakhstan 20 December, which is a gross violation of the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) signed last July between the United States and the Soviet Union. This missile test constitutes a danger to peace. Who gave the order to carry out the launch? Is the system of control of Soviet strategic missile forces really in the hands of the Russian authorities in Moscow? Could the Kazakh leaders in Alma-Ata have pressed the button despite the agreement between the former Soviet republics? None of the problems that have arisen in connection with the breakup of the Soviet Union worries American and Western politicians as seriously as the future of the huge nuclear arsenals of the former superpower."

"Nothing of this kind has happened or could have happened on the territory of Kazakhstan," Lieutenant General S.K. Nurmagambetov, chairman of the Republic of Kazakhstan Defense Committee, said in reply to the editorial office's question. "All this is the invention of idle journalists, from start to finish. Since the government of Kazakhstan knows of no such launch, that means that there was none. I simply cannot imagine that in the present situation, when the problems of sovereignty are particularly sensitive, any of the former Union departments—even including the military department—would dare to violate the rights of an independent state so patently."

However, in answer to a supplementary question, the chairman of the republic defense committee admitted that Kazakhstan does not have the technical facilities to monitor [prokontrolirovat] launches of space devices. And that means, S.K. Nurmagambetov added, that

"despite the close contacts we have long had with the leaders of the strategic forces, only they can give a final answer."

It became apparent from the explanations obtained by the editorial office from the Directorate of the Chief of Space Forces that THE WASHINGTON POST report certainly cannot be judged an invention "from start to finish." It is true, General Yu. Gusev, deputy chief of space systems and arms, said, that a "test launch of a space delivery vehicle which was adapted from an SS-19 missile" was carried out in Kazakhstan 20 December.

The general also explained that the launch was planned and the American partners were notified beforehand of its nature, objectives, and the technical facilities involved. In particular, the general added, U.S. Under Secretary of State Bartholomew, who visited Moscow recently, knew about it.

As for the question whether the Republic of Kazakhstan State Defense Committee was informed, what the explanation amounted to was that "Alma-Ata knew all about it." The general referred to a decision by the now defunct USSR military industrial commission.

"The plan for test launches of space vehicles in 1991 was approved by this Union commission in February 1991 and was then confirmed in July 1991," Gen. Yu. Gusev said.

"Before the creation of the independent state of Kazakhstan, that is?" we asked, seeking clarification.

The general answered with a question:

"And when was independent Kazakhstan created?"

Apparently, Russian, Kazakhstan, and U.S. experts have yet to exchange views on whether the launch was a breach of treaties concluded between the United States and the USSR. But the issue is no less acute within the Commonwealth of Independent States.

For President N. Nazarbayev, who received the greatest plaudits at last week's All-Army Officers' Assembly, this space launch will be a very important precedent. On the day THE WASHINGTON POST published the article in question N. Nazarbayev was assuring British Foreign Secretary D. Hurd of his ability to control the use of the nuclear and space potential on the territory of Kazakhstan. And if it is confirmed that the military carried out a dubious launch without consulting Alma-Ata and even without informing it, the reaction will not be long delayed.

An exponent of the restrained approach, President N. Nazarbayev may decide not to publicize the incident. But he will want to have effective control, which would prevent the humiliating situation the independent republic finds itself in at the moment from happening in the future.

Kazakhstan Not Informed

LD2301210792 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1100 GMT 22 Jan 92

[Commentary by Igor Ambrosev]

[Text] [Announcer] The problems of the Army, of the officers, of the strategic forces, of nuclear weapons, and so forth seem to be becoming one of the constant subjects of discussion in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. But for the moment the politicians are hardly able to come to an agreement about the most fundamental issues, and life is throwing up ever new problems.

The newspaper IZVESTIYA reported on one of them in the Moscow evening issue for 20 January. It was unexpectedly discovered that exactly a month ago space units of the Armed Forces conducted an experimental launching of a missile from the territory of sovereign Kazakhstan. And precisely the launch vehicle was remodelled from an SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missile. The State Defense Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan was not informed of the planned launch. Here is a commentary from Igor Ambrosev:

[Ambrosev] First of all I would like to warn against interpreting this event as, let's say, a reason for exacerbation in Russian-Kazakhstan relations. Unfortunately, the headline in IZVESTIYA directly prompts one to such an interpretation. The headline states: Moscow launches a missile from Kazakhstan, but informs Washington of this and not Alma-Ata. However, the situation is not as simple as that. One should not search for the roots of what happened in Moscow, but most likely in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha. Yes, yes, precisely there, and precisely at the time when the start of the process of reorganizing our statehood began, a process which turned out to be extremely complicated.

The unexpected things on our new path are occurring in clusters. And the launching of the missile clearly reflects the entire complexity of the situation.

Let's go back a month to the middle of December. What happened then? There was joy at the abolition of the center of the empire. The groundwork was being prepared for the meeting on 21 December in Alma-Ata. But not only that: The process was unfolding of—I apologize for the pun—folding up the activity of the Union structure. Well, except for the Armed Forces. This is how the formulas in the Belovezhskoye agreement read on the united command of common military and strategic space. And in these circumstances the launching of the missile on 20 December, on the eve of the meeting in Alma-Ata, could in no way be considered extraordinary.

However, on 20 January, after Evans and Novak of THE WASHINGTON POST, who have been known since the times of the cold war, assessed the launch as a blatant violation of the treaty on reducing strategic offensive

missiles, the problem started to appear somewhat different. At the Defense Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan the report by the U.S. side that a missile had been launched was at first denied. In actual fact, since Alma-Ata had not been informed of the launch, this means that the launch did not take place. This is from the point of view of logic and of the declaration of sovereignty and the republics' respect for each other's rights. But one has to amend one's position according to circumstances which can be disrupted by logic [as heard].

The circumstances are as follows: The plan for the experimental launch of space objects for 1991 was ratified by the Military Industrial Commission of the USSR in February 1991 and confirmed in July that year. And even if the commission was abolished, no one contemplated abolishing its plans. The issue of notification of any kind of military activity is not regulated by any interrepublican or interstate treaty. This is precisely the reason why Washington, which is linked with Moscow by means of the treaty, was informed of the launch and Alma-Ata was not.

And what is most dreadful is that these absurdities will continue in the future, too, until such time as a reinforcement of relations among the sovereign republics with strictly binding treaties is started. Serious, detailed, multilateral treaties are needed, at least with regard to issues relating to the strategic forces. But a treaty is needed reinforcing bilateral relations on all the issues that are important to one pair of sovereign states or another. At least what has already been established in Minsk, Alma-Ata, and in Minsk again cannot be effective. And as far as Evans and Novak from the WASHINGTON POST are concerned, they have simply not restructured themselves yet, and their attempt to present the affair as if the missile was launched by the new, independent Republic of Kazakhstan is in their old spirit. THE WASHINGTON POST needs to have its attention drawn to the behavior of its observers. It is time to reject the stereotypes of the cold war, as Vadim Bakatin and Andrey Kozyrev are teaching us.

Official Interviewed

LD2301212392 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1500 GMT 22 Jan 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] In the last two days there has been a lot of talk about a ballistic missile launch from the territory of Kazakhstan. U.S. officials began to wonder who made this decision and whether the Kazakhstan authorities knew about this. But the rumors about the launch of a military missile were highly exaggerated. [A page from IZVESTIYA is shown with headline: Moscow launches a missile from Kazakhstan, but informs Washington of this and not Alma-Ata]

[Begin recording] [Unidentified reporter] The article constantly mentions that the launch was carried out on the decision of the Soviet Military Industrial Commission. Now there is no such commission, but the launch was carried out. Why is there a connection?

[Y.G.Gusev, deputy commander of space units in the Defense Ministry] In February 1991 the plan for the experimental launches, the launches for the needs of the national economy and space research, was approved by this commission. The same commission confirmed the plan for the second half of that year. Until the new structures are created the old plans are in force. It was said and explained repeatedly in the decrees and decisions of the Russian Government that during the transitional period it would be guided by the legislation of the former Soviet Union. Therefore, at the moment of its implementation, the launch was carried out in strict accordance with the directives which had been drawn up.

[Reporter] If we are to reject the Military Industrial Commission decisions now, then all the civilian launches should be cancelled too?

[Gusev] Of course, since no other document exists which establishes a plan for the launches for the purposes of the national economy. [end recording]

Further on Launch

LD2301215692 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 22 Jan 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Reports in a number of newspapers about the supposed malfunctioning launch of a SS-19 missile from Baykonur has aroused a number of misinterpretations not only here but abroad as well. General Gusev, deputy head of space resources, has agreed to explain the situation for our program.

[Begin recording] [Slichenko] This rocket is called Zenith. There have been 15 launches, 2 of which had accidents. Only 40 minutes elapse from the time of reaching the pad until the launch. Zenith was to replace the famous Semerka which took people into space. Americans who watched the launch and examined the technical characteristics said: This is impossible—to create such motors we need 10 billion and 10 years. The launcher was developed and tested at the Baykonur cosmodrome.

The most important thing in this [IZVESTIYA] article is the headline: Moscow launches a missile from Kazakhstan, but informs Washington of this and not Alma-Ata. The missile was launched from Kazakhstan, the Baykonur cosmodrome. Is there any difference here?

[Gusev] Undoubtedly there is a difference. The missile was launched from Baykonur cosmodrome. If you follow

the logic of the article's authors then the missile was launched from Kazakhstan, it was launched using its resources and the appropriate button, and if this is a military missile, then Kazakhstan has the right to launch such military missiles. Today, as we know from the results of the Alma-Ata and Minsk meetings, there is a single nuclear button and, therefore, the information in this article does not correspond to reality. The launch took place in Kazakhstan, but on Baykonur cosmodrome territory.

[Slichenko] So it turns out that it is practically impossible to stop scientific research work on missiles now in order to create new missiles, not military, but civilian ones.

[Gusev] Of course, in order to turn a military missile into a civilian one it is necessary to introduce the necessary construction and technical changes, and of course when creating any new space carrier a program of flight tests is created during which flight launches take place.

[Slichenko] Is it possible to say that military launch tubes, launch tubes which contain military missiles, will in future launch purely civilian loads?

[Gusev] Yes, you can put it like that. The treaty on cutting strategic offensive weapons envisages that every country has up to 20 launch pads, including vertical launch tubes, with minimal alterations of the appropriate equipment, which will make possible launching useful loads into space.

[Slichenko] The launch is managed from Moscow. To what degree does Kazakhstan or Alma-Ata have any influence on this work?

[Gusev] Kazakhstan is only notified about the launches—the flight path, the area where the first stage falls—so that the local authorities can ensure safety for the launch. Kazakhstan is notified about every launch in this manner. It is beyond the scope of any republic, in my view, to implement any space program in our conditions. This is connected to the infrastructure of the whole missile-space industry and also to the infrastructure of space involved bases situated throughout the whole territory—specifically in five republics—of the former Soviet Union. Therefore, to say that one of the republics—apart from Russia—can work independently on space would probably be inaccurate today. [end recording]

Military Official Denies START Violation

*PM2301163192 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Jan 92 p 4*

[Response by Major General Yu. Gusev, deputy chief of Space Units, to reader's letter, carried under the "Reader's Briefing" rubric: "Baykonur Is Launching Missiles, But Not Live Ones"—first two paragraphs are reader's letter]

[Text] I read of the launch of a live SS-19 missile from the Baykonur Space Center in the 20 January issue of IZVESTIYA. The use of these missiles, in the opinion of WASHINGTON POST commentators, is in breach of the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) concluded between the United States and the USSR last July. Is this actually so?

[Signed] Z. Alekseyev, Moscow

The START Treaty envisages that ICBM's and launchers be equipped for use as systems for delivering various payloads into space and the upper strata of the atmosphere. It should be added that the Americans are already using Titan-2 ICBM's for this purpose and that it is planned to utilize stages of the MX ballistic missile in the future.

As far back as 11 October 1990 KRSNAYA ZVEZDA reported that work to refit decommissioned ICBM's as light-class launch vehicles has been carried out in our country in recent years for conversion purposes. It was planned, as the newspaper wrote, that these launch vehicles, equipped with a specially created booster unit, would deliver various cargoes into outer space in the interests of science and the national economy.

The tests held 20 November 1990 and 20 December 1991, when the Baykonur Space Center launched experimental launch vehicles and booster units on a ballistic trajectory solely over the territory of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, were in conformity with those aims.

The aim of the launches was to check the correctness of the chosen technical and design solutions. The booster units ended their existence (burned up) in the upper strata of the atmosphere over the Kamchatka peninsula.

There is one final point to be noted. Previously the established procedure was to inform only the local organs of management in Kazakhstan about launches from Baykonur, since they were kept abreast of all that happened. Now, with the declaration of sovereignty, we will notify the president of the republic via the Defense Committee.

Commission To Regulate Cosmodrome

*LD2301182692 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1500 GMT 23 Jan 92*

[Excerpt] Now some news from the INTERFAX agency. Kazakhstan intends to hold talks with the defense and space departments so as to finally end the problem related to the use of the Baykonur cosmodrome. This was stated by the republic's first deputy prime minister in Alma-Ata. A commission will be set up to regulate activity at Baykonur. It will make a review of the cosmodrome's activities and determine the principles according to which it is used. The deputy prime minister levelled scathing criticism at Colonel General Ivanov, the commander of the space system, who only gave

notification of a planned routine launching at the cosmodrome on 25 January instead of requesting permission from the republic. [passage omitted]

SS-19s Used in Carrier Rocket Launch Tests

*LD2101223192 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2006 GMT 21 Jan 92*

[By TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 21 Jan (TASS)—A TASS correspondent was told at the Defense Ministry space units press service that since November 1990, there have been experimental launches of carrier rockets whose main element consists of combat missiles, including SS-19's, which are being removed from military service.

The last launch, on 20 December 1991 and which evoked a great reaction from the press, was not as menacing as observers maintain. This is the planned start of a converted intercontinental ballistic missile, which it is proposed to use for conversion purposes to place useful cargoes into space orbit in the interests of science and for the benefit of the economy of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The purpose of such launches, which is in accord with the START treaty, is to test the correctness of technical and design decisions by utilizing missiles that are being removed from combat duty. Until recently, these missiles were being destroyed by being blown up.

U.S., Kazakhstan Discuss Arms Issues

Legislative Delegations Meet

*PM2301170092 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Jan 92 First Edition p 2*

[Correspondent Sergey Skorokhodov report: "Kazakhstan Would Like Guarantees of Territorial Integrity"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—At the Kazakh Supreme Soviet a meeting took place recently with a delegation from the U.S. Congress, headed by Senator James Exon, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence. The congressmen were received by Kh. Yerezhpov, deputy chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet.

Today we are less concerned about the fact that Moscow formerly promoted the proliferation of nuclear weapons, J. Exon said in his speech. We are much more concerned about the brain drain of nuclear experts from the countries of the former Union. Yet, the senator believes, the fewer nuclear republics there are, the quicker and easier it will be to reach agreement on reducing the nuclear arms of Russia and the United States. Conversely, the more republics join in the "nuclear games," the more difficult this process will be.

K. Kozhakhmetov set forth the Kazakh delegation's position, though he did refer to it as his personal

opinion. He stressed that Kazakhstan is geographically located between two great nuclear powers: China and Russia. In view of the problems that exist between the republic and its eastern neighbor, including territorial problems, Kazakhstan would like to have certain guarantees of its territorial integrity in the context of switching to the status of nuclear-free state.

Furthermore, pointing out that the republic was a nuclear testing range for 40 years, K. Kozhakhmetov came out unequivocally in favor of the view that the elimination of nuclear weapons on its territory should be associated with concrete help in resolving a number of economic and ecological problems—help especially from Russia but also from China and the entire world community. When it becomes a nuclear-free zone, Kazakhstan would like there to be no testing ranges or storage facilities for nuclear weapons within a certain distance of its borders.

The sides refrained from more specific discussion of the problems raised and only exchanged diplomatically courteous statements on the coincidence of their positions and their intentions of achieving a nuclear-free world.

Talks With Bartholomew on START

*PM2301134392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Jan 92 Single Edition p 3*

[By correspondent Colonel A. Ladin: "No Tactical Nuclear Weapons on Kazakhstan's Territory"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—The official U.S. delegation headed by U.S. Under Secretary of State R. Bartholomew, which is in Alma-Ata, was received by S. Nurmagambetov, chairman of the Kazakh State Committee for Defense. [passage omitted]

The U.S. side voiced its concern over the fate of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START] that has been signed. R. Bartholomew suggested that on behalf of the four states on whose territory nuclear weapons are located, the START treaty should, by mutual consent, be ratified by Russia so that mutual relations between two and not several partners can be retained.

In this connection S. Nurmagambetov stated that an acceptable form for ratifying the START treaty could be found only after the elaboration of the relevant agreement between the heads of the sovereign states and discussions of this document in the parliaments of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and the Ukraine. He also stressed that right now there are no longer any tactical nuclear weapons on Kazakhstan's territory.

The U.S. delegation presented the Kazakhstan State Committee for Defense with a package of documents containing proposals for controlling arms exports.

Quick Elimination of Nuclear Arsenal Urged*PM2301153392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 5*

[Interview with Sergey Blagovolin, president of the independent Russian Institute for National Security and Strategic Studies, by Sergey Guk; place and date not given: "NATO Can Be the Guarantor of Russia's Security"]

[Text] [Guk] British Prime Minister J. Major recently advocated that the UN Security Council should tackle the problem of the former USSR's nuclear arsenals. To all appearances, people in the West do not have very much faith in the ability of the leaders of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] to keep the situation under control. It turns out that they want virtually to place us under international tutelage—which is offensive. Have things really come to this?

[Blagovolin] It is possible not to be concerned about the fate of our nuclear arsenals in the immediate future. Unless there is a slide toward chaos, it is possible to rely on the guarantees of the CIS leaders. However, it would be a sign of quite unjustified optimism to believe that the worst has already passed us by.

[Guk] What really threatens the nuclear potential of the former USSR?

[Blagovolin] Is it really not clear? People in our country are today seizing military weapons dumps—who will guarantee that things will not go so far as missiles and warheads? Of course, terrorists will not succeed in launching a strategic missile, but they are quite capable of destroying warheads with subsequent contamination of the locality. Adventurers could do anything they like with tactical weapons that fall into their hands. This is why it is important to eliminate them as quickly as possible.

[Guk] Are the forecasts not too somber?

[Blagovolin] Nothing must be ruled out in hotbeds of mass disturbances and military conflicts. The leakage of "know-how" and brains to foreign countries is equally real. I cannot at present see any barrier that would halt the outflow of specialists. The example of Iraq is in the public eye. It would be tragic if our collapse played a fateful role in creating new regions of instability in the world.

[Guk] In our own home above all. Instead of pooling resources in the struggle against economic disaster, many CIS leaders are devoting all their efforts to the struggle to take the Armed Forces apart.

[Blagovolin] I agree. Even after signing the Minsk agreements, each of the republics has set about making its own interpretation of them. They want, let us assume, to create their own armed forces—a perfectly legitimate desire. But why always by "annexing" entire units and garrisons, regardless of the fact that this could have very

grave consequences and undermine the foundations of security? Disregarding the wishes of many servicemen, in respect of whom they use threats and promises to make them take a new oath? You must not, after all, "confiscate" living people!

It Will Be Decided During the Year Whether There Will Be a Dictatorship in Russia

[Guk] It is all in the spirit of the accords: The CIS is not a state and, consequently, there must not be unified armed forces, must there?

[Blagovolin] I cannot understand why there is such haste. Serious discontent is swelling in the Armed Forces, as no one is taking account of the interests of servicemen and their families—these are many millions of people—in the breakup that is taking place, and they are being cut to the quick. This is wrong. Military people are not puppets. You must not endlessly abuse the long-suffering people who hold weapons. Forces which dream of restoring the former usages might take advantage of their discontent.

[Guk] Maybe people in the republics are in such a hurry because they fear a new coup in Moscow and are afraid that they will once again be driven into a socialist camp—with the emphasis on the last word?

[Blagovolin] If they fear a putsch... Well, I can say to this that the question of whether or not there will be a dictatorship will be decided very soon. During this year.

[Guk] Why such conviction?

[Blagovolin] It is perfectly obvious that, if the reforms which Russia is now implementing do not fail and are not torpedoed and if there is not a social explosion—largely a provoked one (which I fear)—then no coup is foreseen. I will say more and even risk being misinterpreted. The fate of democracy in all parts of the former Union now depends on how things go in Russia. The leaders of all the CIS countries and the Baltic states must understand this. Remember the three days of the August putsch: The events in Moscow elicited a funeral knell in all the republics. All were rooted to the spot, as it were, and nobody protested. I will repeat yet again—the fate of the former Union is today being decided in Russia. If it holds out, the others will also have their own future; if not, no customs and borders will save the day. It will all be decided quite quickly.

Prescription for Salvation: Destroy Tactical Weapons, Hand Over Strategic Weapons to Russia

[Guk] Let us return to our starting position. How, in these troubled times, are we to secure ourselves and the rest of the world against "surprises" connected with the possible loss of control over at least a part of the nuclear arsenals?

[Blagovolin] Tactical weapons must be destroyed, and the rest handed over to Russia. People wrongly think that nuclear weapons are a kind of privilege; they are a

heavy burden. In this sense Russia is, by dint of objective factors, the Union's heir. So let these weapons be concentrated in Russia. Are some of the new leaders really afraid of nuclear blackmail by Moscow?

[Guk] Blackmail or no blackmail, still Leonid Kravchuk has announced his intention to eliminate nuclear weapons in Ukraine and made it clear that he would be happier to see Russia nuclear-free too....

[Blagovolin] I have always been opposed to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, at any rate in the foreseeable future. This can only be done after the creation of a global system of mutual guarantees, for otherwise we could become the hostages of some other Saddam Husayn or alliance of dictators. We have entered a period of new global instability. Russia must become part of the international security structure, and as such the world still needs us as a nuclear power. We must not rely on the United States' maintaining security for us, as it did for everyone in the Persian Gulf. Being an integrated part of a security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok means fulfilling certain obligations, including the maintenance of modern armed forces.

[Guk] Pardon me, but who has invited us?

[Blagovolin] The West, which is already ready for a phased transition to such a security system. One thing is holding it back—it is not clear what might happen in our country tomorrow. What is needed is internal stabilization in Russia and a full revision of the concept of national security with due regard for the fact that there is no longer a threat from NATO. NATO today is our natural ally. We must build a bridge between Moscow and Brussels more quickly. If necessary, over the heads of those who are not yet ready for this. It is time to abandon our absurd fears of NATO's approach to our borders. The North Atlantic Alliance is now, if you like, the guarantor of our security. If we could join it today, this would be the best option for us from the viewpoint of ensuring our security. But, for this, it is necessary first to ensure a certain compatibility of structures and of the nature of military activity, openness, and civilian control. New people must appear in the Army leadership who do not take the old view of NATO as the enemy. Particularly as there are, alas, many real threats. The more quickly we travel the path of creating a security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok, the better. No one is capable of touching such a cumbersome thing.

The World Needs Russia As a Nuclear Power

[Guk] One small thing is lacking: stability in Russia. How can this be achieved?

[Blagovolin] By using presidential power to instill order. It is not a question of a dictatorship but of a power under which people are obliged to fulfill the laws that exist. I do not know of a more democratic country than the United States, but just let someone there try to accomplish just one-hundredth part of what is being done in our country. Democracy means responsibility, not anarchy and chaos.

Our great compatriot Solzhenitsyn rightly said: It is possible to descend from the heights of totalitarianism only with the reins held tight. I do not rule out the possibility that in a number of cases it will be necessary to go over to direct rule in the provinces, like rule by a governor.

[Guk] But where are the legally elected soviets to go?

[Blagovolin] They are to suspend activities if they wreck the reforms. This is what Gorbachev should have done.

[Guk] That is, a coup from above, after the pattern set by Yanayev, Pavlov, and Kryuchkov?

[Blagovolin] The word coup is inappropriate here. I am talking about a concentration of power, only not against the reforms but for their sake. If the Russian president sees that deliberate sabotage is taking place and that there is no other way, I will be the first to approve of any decisive actions by Yeltsin to save Russia. The most terrible thing is that in many respects he is beginning to repeat Gorbachev's mistakes.

[Guk] Which ones, for example?

[Blagovolin] Well, he is appointing his plenipotentiaries in the provinces and they are not being allowed to work. Is this to be endured, as he is doing at present? Why is it possible to call publicly and with impunity for the overthrow of the legitimate power? I understand that everyone in power today wants to be a "pure democrat." But experience, political culture, and time are needed to create a working democratic model. We have none of this. Therefore I entreat Yeltsin to be a strong head of state. It is necessary to save the chief thing—Russia, its integrity, and our unique opportunity to become a part of the civilized community. Incidentally, people in the West also understand perfectly what will happen if democracy in Russia collapses and power passes to the hands of some dictator—it seems to me that there are quite a few candidates here.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Lithuania's Landsbergis Continues Calls for Soviet Withdrawal

Seeks Commonwealth Help

*LD2212071491 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English
2230 GMT 20 Dec 91*

[Text] The chairman of the Lithuanian parliament, Vytautas Landsbergis, has sent letters to the leaders of Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia in which he notes with satisfaction that the Commonwealth of Independent States has taken upon itself the settlement of problems related to the Armed Forces of the former Soviet Union. The head of the Lithuanian parliament writes that he is confident the stand taken by the member states of the Commonwealth will contribute to the solution of concrete issues of the Soviet troops' withdrawal

from the Baltic states. Vytautas Landsbergis speaks out against the Soviet military stationed in Lithuania having any contacts with the armed Bolshevik underground in the republic. He also points out in his letters that, by the decision of the Baltic Council adopted in October, Soviet troops had to be withdrawn from the capital cities of Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn by 1 December, but the leadership of the former Soviet Union had in no way reacted to the decision. The letters accentuate that an inspection of Soviet military bases by Lithuanian authorities would enable the Republic of Lithuania to be responsible for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Vytautas Landsbergis reminds the leaders of the Commonwealth that, following the Soviet occupation of Lithuania in 1940, the Army of the republic was fully destroyed. Therefore, now the losses should be compensated for by modern weapons.

[Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian at 1000 GMT on 20 December adds that Landsbergis' letters also "described problems examined at the North Atlantic assembly seminar and proposed to discuss them."]

Interviewed on Political Problems

LD2001151792 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Russian 1300 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Interview granted by Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis to unidentified program announcer; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] The historical experience of Lithuania indicates that the presence of foreign troops on its territory has always presented a real threat to the independence of the republic. The official circles of Lithuania today favor the immediate withdrawal of troops of the former Soviet Union from its territory. However, under conditions of the collapse of the Soviet Union it is not clear who is to make the political decision on the withdrawal of the troops, and the dates of the withdrawal on the opposite side. Therefore, esteemed chairman of the Supreme Council [Landsbergis], according to you, who is authorized to decide this question: The political leadership of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], of Russia, or the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the CIS?

[Landsbergis] I think that this isn't so much a political question, or even this is not a political issue at all, because the political question has already been solved. Absolutely so, and not only the entire world community but also the former Soviet Union, and prior to that, Russia, have recognized the restored independence of Lithuania, the further existence of the sovereign Lithuanian state. Everything else proceeds from this. There must be no presence of foreign troops, the more so, in that there are no legal grounds for this presence. They are simply present here *de facto* as an inheritance of the unhappy times and by the criminal decisions of Talins' leadership. All this has been inherited.

For some time we had a kind of practical problem—armed forces without a master. Currently everything is becoming clearer. I do not see in this—like some people say, or even as you mentioned—the collapse of the Soviet Union; this is not a collapse, it is a reorganization, or even *perestroyka* if you like, in the right direction. The Armed Forces of the former Soviet Union already have their leadership, and an address to which we can write in order to solve not the political but the technical aspect of the issue—how, when, within what period of time, and so on. Of course, we want to have a minimal period of time, the more so, taking the current situation, which is unthinkable when a mighty force, a foreign one, as well, is deployed in the capital city.

Now there is the Commonwealth and its leadership, or simply Russia, which declared in December that it is in charge of the Armed Forces deployed in the Baltic states. This is very good. Our relations with Russia are good and open, and I think that we will resolve this question.

[Announcer] General Mironov, commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, said that the issue of the withdrawal of troops must be solved on the basis of a specific bilateral agreement between each Baltic state and Russia. Do you think this is an optimal version?"

[Landsbergis] Perhaps this is so. Perhaps there will be a slightly different approach dealing with the dates and problems. We do not have a naval fleet and, say, submarine bases [word indistinct] such as those in Estonia or Latvia. Perhaps we will have some other specific issues which will be easier to discuss separately between Lithuania and Russia than, let us say, between all the four. Therefore I do not see anything wrong with this approach. The issue is that both the military and the state leadership of Russia understood that the matter could not be postponed. This has to be decided, and it is necessary to start this process, and then various specific points will arise, such as our demand for compensation for the seized military equipment in 1940. Lithuania, like Latvia and Estonia had their own armed forces, and invested in them national property. We need such forces now, to serve the border, preserve order and so forth. But we have no equipment, so we should at least have compensation, decided immediately, for what was seized by the former Soviet Union.

[Announcer] The question of withdrawal of troops will take some time to be resolved. What will be Lithuania's policy during that period on foreign armed forces stationed on its territory?

[Landsbergis] We do not have bad relations. There are no conflict situations, and so we shall aspire to maintain these forces. Certain independent states are simply declaring these forces to be their property. We have a totally different attitude. We see them as alien, foreign forces, and we will look at them differently. There should be no conflicts of principle with the specific soldiers or officers. In law they are alien, occupation forces. But we do not view these troops as hostile, the more so when

they are (mainly) from Russia, with which we are (building) good relations. Even so, there are some practical problems connected with self-determination—let's put it that way—of the officer corps. Some of the officers and members of their families would like to be Lithuanian citizens in accordance with our legislation. Some want to enter civilian life and stay in Lithuania. There is a growing number of Lithuanian officers from far-flung regions of the former Soviet Union. This still remains to be discussed.

[Announcer] What is your view on those who would like to stay here and adopt Lithuanian citizenship.

[Landsbergis] It depends on the occupation of these people at the moment. If they continue to serve in the Armed Forces, then a question may arise if it is legal for our citizens to serve in a foreign army? And namely, according to the law, they must not serve in the armed forces of foreign states, particularly without special permission. Therefore, such a question, on a legal basis, will arise.

[Announcer] Despite this, colleagues from Russia's Radio informed us that they had information that apartments in which servicemen reside are allegedly being privatized by unauthorized people.

[Landsbergis] Nothing can be privatized by unauthorized persons, especially if the servicemen themselves do not want to sell these apartments. The fact that the apartments are transferred to the jurisdiction and [word indistinct] of the local authorities creates the conditions for those families currently residing in them.

[Announcer] Including the families of servicemen?

[Landsbergis] That's right. These are the families of servicemen. Before, they were not the owners of these apartments, and now these families can make their own decisions. This is to the benefit of the families of the servicemen. If someone is throwing mud at this issue and spreading information of this nature in Russia, then—well, we are familiar with this method from earlier times. It is a pity it is still in use.

What is absolutely inadmissible is the introduction of new contingents. This has been observed of late, and was a great surprise to us. We were even (?filled with indignation) [words indistinct] or to make a protest.

[Announcer] This had not been coordinated with the government of Lithuania and its leadership?

[Landsbergis] That's right. It was not coordinated, and neither was the strange announcement of maneuvers, which was also made without asking for such maneuvers to be conducted on our sovereign territory. It is now becoming clear that perhaps there isn't such an official under whose signature the telegram was sent. Is this another provocation, is it a forgery of some sort? This will be investigated by the military leadership.

Such difficulties, this type of slipping toward a conflict, small though it may be, is absolutely unnecessary.

'Still Unsolved Issue'

LD1701212292 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 17 Jan 92

[Regular Friday radio address by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] There are dangers to us and to Russia from the same source—the still unsolved issue of the former Soviet Army. We see it from our window: what will they do here in Lithuania, are they going to move, hold exercises without asking for our permission? This time we have shown that it is essential to ask our permission. The movements of would-be provocateurs have been stopped, they returned to their places.

This concerns not only Lithuania. Some commanders of the former Soviet Army still imagine that there exists some Union, a single large state and they would like to maintain a single large army so that with the help of this army they will regain that large state and restore it as a single state.

Of course, such a danger would be danger to the whole world. Let us hope that there will be no such attempts. But anything can happen, evidently, and we must be concerned and cautious both in our policies and in our relations with military units.

We have domestic troubles and tensions because of the reform which is taking place in Lithuania, that is, economic reform, privatization, and agrarian reform. Many people from outside say that things are progressing quite well in our country and faster than in the neighboring countries. Some neighbors look on with envy and wish to learn from us. But it often seems to us that things are progressing too slowly, that there are many obstacles. We see these in Lithuania, in the actions of the officials. We see various kinds of injustice, we see plundering, thefts.

One thinks how to resist it. But there exists an old custom among people—wait until some high authority comes from Vilnius to the rayon, parish, or village and introduces order. There is as yet little determination to resist wrongs and maintain order by ourselves. On the other hand, there exists impatience and tension and there are people to incite this impatience and tension. The former activists of the Burokevicius party and old KGB officials who maintain their agents and their connections have not lost hope. We have read in the press that the notorious KGB man, Naudziunas, is returning to Lithuania to save it from some dangers. He was saving it a year ago, in January last year, when he even set up a salvation committee. God forbid, that such bloodshed and such provocations will take place again in Lithuania.

We must look around and remember how things used to be a few years ago and how we used to live locked up.

without any hope of change. We can see what is happening in Russia and other neighboring states, what difficulties have been encountered by Estonia, which used to be praised, and then, maybe, we will be aware of the fact that not everything in Lithuania is only bad and black, as is maintained by some newspapers or by some faint-hearted people who say: "We are perishing, it is bad, bankruptcy. We heard this two years ago, before the proclamation of independence, then during the first Soviet blockade. Since we did not perish then, we are not going to perish now. [passage omitted]

I am certain that the future belongs to toil and to the workers in each sphere, discipline, and to looking toward the future of our country, not towards one's own small concerns. This feeling is present in Lithuania. People, when they think, know from where we have come and in which direction we are advancing.

On Yeltsin Meeting

*LD2001221292 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1430 GMT 18 Jan 92*

[Remarks by Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis on his talks with Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow 17 January at a news conference moderated by press attache Audrius Azubalis at the Supreme Council in Vilnius on 18 January—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Landsbergis] The list of the issues was very extensive and we solved them speedily and, I may say, in the spirit of complete mutual understanding. [passage omitted]

The second important topic, and it was started by Boris Yeltsin himself, was military affairs and the pullout of the Army. He reported that Russia has officially stated in a decision, in a presidential decree, that the former Soviet Army deployed in the Baltic states was being taken into Russia's jurisdiction. Military people are now responsible to the Russian government in accordance with Russia's laws. But this does not mean that they are not responsible to the laws of Lithuania or any other sovereign state.

Boris Yeltsin further agreed, in the documents, while discussing the Army, to refer to it as one that is to be withdrawn, an army to be withdrawn from Lithuania. The procedure and certain dates for the withdrawal itself will be set by the joint commission which begins work next week. It has been given one month to agree on the order of the Army's withdrawal.

Of course, we did not predict how much time the withdrawal of the Army itself will take. We agreed yesterday on how much time should be allotted for reaching an agreement concerning the order. Our demand, which we expressed last year to a government that was no longer functioning, to have the Army withdrawn from Vilnius, was also recognized. It was agreed

that no divisions or similar armed forces of another country will be left in the center of Vilnius. That priority was accepted.

Boris Yeltsin and the Russian delegation expressed something understood by all of us, i.e., the withdrawal of the Army is connected with its stable maintenance in the new location. That especially concerns the housing of officers' families and the provision of those [word indistinct] which remain here temporarily. It goes without saying that the entire Army can not be withdrawn at the same time, in one day. Purchases of supplies or possible purchases also cause concern, not only for the military leadership directly, but also for the Russian leadership, because additional tensions may develop because of them. It is necessary to avoid them.

Therefore it is noted in the communique [words indistinct] that understandably we are not going to discontinue the supplies of food, electricity [words indistinct] on establishing. Compensation for these services will be included directly, following appropriate accounting, into the economic relations agreements between Lithuania and Russia.

The resolution of the social questions: construction of officers' housing in Russia will be the goal of further agreements between us. We discussed the possibilities of constructing in Russia, or or in some other [word indistinct] while we would to help with the work force and materials.

A separate question, involved in the entire withdrawal of that military complex, involves anti-aircraft defense units, in which Russia is especially interested because they are carrying out defense functions here, which will be necessary [words indistinct]. It would take a lot of time to install them outside Lithuania's borders. Apparently, we will have special deliberations on this concerning the possibility of our side providing Russia a service of that nature. We also touched on the supplying of Lithuanian Territorial Defense Forces and border institution services and how Russia could help. We have agreed on this, right there on the spot, concerning the handing over of our sea border. the deputy defense minister, General Grachev, will arrive in Lithuania soon and we will discuss both questions—the transfer of sea border control and questions of air space control. Lithuania's air space must also be transferred to us.

We have agreed very quickly that we shall arrive at positive solutions on the needs of Konigsberg Region Lithuanians. [passage omitted]

Reports on Issue of Soviet Troops in Estonia

Ruutel Statement on CIS Formation

*LD2812181291 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1800 GMT 26 Dec 91*

[Excerpts] I will first read out a press statement by Arnold Ruutel, chairman of the republic of Estonia Supreme Council.

The setting up of a Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], the subsequent resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev, USSR president, and the USSR coming to an end in its activity are events of a major political impact. Like most other states of the world, we in Estonia also value the contribution of Mikhail Gorbachev in starting the reforms. Processes that were set in motion in 1985 have been of a major importance also for the restoration of the independence of the republic of Estonia. [passage omitted]

The republic of Estonia is ready to develop on her part profitable and equally based relations with the states that belong in the Commonwealth of Independent States as subjects with full rights of international law. At the same time, we note that the military units of the former USSR stationed in Estonia are made up of citizens of those states. There is hope in the republic of Estonia that the parliaments and governments of member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States will, without delay, adopt resolutions on ending the service of their citizens in the forces that are in Estonia without any legal basis. Their prompt recall home would facilitate in every way a development of the republic of Estonia's relations with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

[Signed] Arnold Ruutel.

Talks With Russian Foreign Minister

LD1401234292 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 2200 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Text] Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev arrived in Tallinn from Kaliningrad today. He held meetings with Lennart Meri, minister of foreign affairs of the Estonian Republic, Edgar Savisaar, head of government, and deputies of the republic's Supreme Soviet representing the Russian community in Estonia. Today Kozyrev is leaving for Bonn. Right before his flight he spoke with Arnold Ruutel, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic.

The Russian and Estonian ministers exchanged documents confirming the ratification by the sides of the treaty on the fundamentals of interstate relations between Russia and Estonia. It was signed on January 12 a year ago, during Boris Yeltsin's visit to the Estonian republic. The subjects under discussion at the current negotiations and talks were the withdrawal of the subunits of the former Union's armed forces from Estonia, prospects for further cooperation, arrangement of humanitarian contacts and observation of human rights.

As stated at the Estonian Republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kozyrev has acknowledged that the military units stationed in Estonia are a foreign body. But he also noted that this abnormal situation is also affecting the interests of Russia. He let it be known that this is the legacy of the already non-existent Soviet Union. But as the successor of the USSR, Russia understands the need for unconditional withdrawal from Estonia of the whole

contingent of the armed forces of the current Commonwealth of the Independent States [CIS]. Kozyrev stated that before flying out of Moscow, Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the CIS supreme commander in chief, had assured him that all tactical nuclear weapons had already been withdrawn from Estonia.

Observers note the importance of another aspect of the Tallinn meetings today. It was deemed necessary to work out a schedule for a new round of the talks between delegations of the two states which Estonia had begun with a delegation of the former Union.

Communique Issued

LD1501093992 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0020 GMT 15 Jan 92

["Communique on the Visit to Estonia by the Russian Foreign Minister"—TASS headline]

[Excerpts] Tallinn, 15 Jan (TASS)—On 14 January, Russian Federation Foreign Minister A.V. Kozyrev was on a working visit to the Estonian Republic at the invitation of the Estonian Government.

During the visit, Kozyrev held meetings with A. Ruutel, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and with E. Savisaar, chairman of the government.

Kozyrev also held talks with Estonian Foreign Minister L. Meri. [passage omitted]

Mutual understanding of the complexity of the problems ensuing from the stay on Estonia's territory by troops of the former Soviet Union was expressed. The necessity for their phased withdrawal, taking into account the interests of mutual security and the very real problems in the social sphere, was stressed.

In connection with Estonia's concern about the possibility of tactical nuclear weapons being found on its territory, the sides again noted the assurances of the armed forces command that tactical nuclear means already have been withdrawn from Estonia as they have been from other Baltic states. [passage omitted]

Soviet Units Leave

PM2101114992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 1

[BALTIYA report: "Soviet Army Leaves Estonia"]

[Text] The Soviet Army has left the military camps at Johvi and Nursi, leaving just a few guard details behind, a BALTIYA correspondent was told by Toomas Puura, chief of the State Chancellery's State and Border Defense Department.

51,358 USSR Army Personnel Stationed in Latvia

LD2812064691 Riga Radio International Service
in English 2130 GMT 27 Dec 91

[Text] The Defense and Interior Committee in the Latvian parliament has announced the exact number of the USSR Army force stationed in Latvia. This information was disclosed during the seminar organized by the North Atlantic Assembly in Vilnius.

At present, 51,348 military persons are located in Latvia, out of which 30,305 are soldiers. Commander in chief of the Baltic Military District, Mironov, agreed to the statement that the presence of military force in the Baltics should not hinder further development of the state.

Baltic States Continue To Press for Soviet Troop Pullout

Baltic Council Issues Appeal

PM1401090392 Vilnius EKHO LITVY
in Russian 7 Jan 92 p 1

[Address to the heads of states of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the immediate and complete withdrawal of the former Soviet Union's Armed Forces from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia signed by A. Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Republic Supreme Council; V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council; and A. Ruutel, chairman of the Estonian Republic Supreme Council; and dated Jurmala, 5 January 1992]

[Text] The Baltic States Council declares that the Armed Forces of the former USSR are still illegally present on the territory of the independent states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia despite the Baltic States' repeated demands for the withdrawal of those troops from their territory. This is incompatible with international law, it is a breach of the state sovereignty of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and does not help to strengthen confidence in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States].

The Baltic States Council, bearing in mind the formation of the CIS and emphasizing that the leadership of the former Soviet Union has given no reply to the Baltic States Council's Statement of 5 October 1991 regarding the immediate withdrawal of the USSR troops from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and especially regarding their withdrawal from the capitals of the Baltic States, appeals to the CIS countries:

- to immediately begin withdrawing the troops from Riga, Vilnius, and Tallinn and from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia as a whole;
- as soon as possible to recall from Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian territory their citizens serving in the Armed Forces of the former USSR and not to allow their citizens to be sent to do military service on the Baltic states' territory;

—to leave weapons, equipment, and combat hardware for the creation of the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian defense forces in view of the fact that Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian military property was seized in 1940;

—not to introduce at their own discretion new contingents of troops of the former Soviet Union into the Baltic states' territory.

[Signed] A. Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Republic Supreme Council

V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council

A. Ruutel, chairman of the Estonian Republic Supreme Council.

[Dated] Jurmala, 5 January 1992.

Garrison Commander on Need To Withdraw Troops

OW1101012292 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1522
GMT 10 Jan 92

[From "Bulletin 1"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Valeriy Frolov, commander of the Vilnius garrison, has said in an interview for the Latvian radio that "the Soviet Army must unconditionally withdraw from Lithuania." He called, however, for dealing with the problem "in a civilized manner" and observed that "our arrival during two days (the reference is to the 1940 occupation—BF [BALTFAX]) does not mean we should leave as quickly."

V. Frolov complained that the status of Soviet troops in the Baltic region was still undefined. He assured the local people that Soviet troops were not posing any threat to them and that the military would not interfere in Lithuanian affairs in any way. The garrison commander said he had succeeded in establishing normal relations with the Lithuanian National Defense Department lately.

Valeriy Frolov was appointed Vilnius garrison commander after the August coup d'etat in the USSR.

Latvia's Gorbunovs Asks Western Aid

LD2301114192 Riga Radio International
in English 2130 GMT 22 Jan 92

[Text] Latvia's President, Anatolijs Gorbunovs, has called on Western European countries to use their military budgets to finance the former Soviet troop withdrawal from the Baltic states. A delegation of the Western European Union, an organization coordinating defense policies in Western Europe, has today arrived in Latvia on a one-day fact-finding mission. The delegation, led by its secretary general, Van Eekelen, met the chairman of the Supreme Council of Latvia Anatolijs Gorbunovs.

The Latvian side informed about the lack of progress of the former Soviet troops withdrawal from Latvia. Provided Western European countries spend one percent, a mere one percent of their military budgets to carry out troop withdrawals from the Baltics, they would significantly improve the security situation on the continent as a whole, Mr. Gorbunovs said addressing the delegation.

The Latvian side received an invitation to participate in a meeting of defense ministers of western and eastern European countries in Helsinki in March.

Official Interviewed Future of WGF Troops

*AU1501135592 Budapest NEPSZAVA
in Hungarian 11 Jan 92 pp 1,2*

[Interview with unidentified official at the Press Department of the Defense Ministry of the Commonwealth of Independent States, by Andrej Kiss in Moscow; date not given: "Shaposhnikov Is the Commander of the Phantom Army—According to Moscow, Many Things Could Happen...."]

[Text] Conflicts have quickly and stormily overcome the unity of interests within the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] hastily created from the pieces of the Soviet Union. While the whole world is paying attention to the Black Sea Fleet and the hundreds of thousands stationed in the Ukraine, however, a phantom army has vanished from the "horizon." This is the Western Group of Forces [WGF] stationed in Germany, which has incredible striking power and is being withdrawn on the basis of an agreement made by the Soviet Union.

We asked the CIS Defense Ministry official who commands the WGF:

[Official] The entire WGF, including all weapons, obeys General Shaposhnikov, the commander-in-chief of the united forces of the CIS.

[Kiss] What about the forces returned to the territory of the former Soviet Union, to the Ukraine and Belarus, for example?

[Official] According to the agreements in force, they are subordinated to General Shaposhnikov the same way as the ones still in Germany.

[Kiss] Does this mean that there are no uncertainties between Moscow and Kiev in relation to the withdrawal?

[Official] It is a well-known fact that there are differences of opinion but, in our view, these do not affect the withdrawal of troops. We carry on with the withdrawals according to the schedule agreed to with the Germans.

[Kiss] The internal policy of the CIS, however, is not progressing according to the "schedule." Could the increasing Russian-Ukrainian debate place the withdrawal schedule in doubt and raise questions as to where the returning soldiers belong?

[Official] Many things could happen, although the newly independent states that later created the CIS also have a valid agreement. Politicians rather than soldiers should resolve the disputed points. We only implement things.

[Kiss] Do your Ukrainian colleagues have the same views?

[Official] Perhaps you should ask them about this.

Russian Statements on Reopening of Vienna Talks

Assumption of Soviet Obligations

*LD1301154892 Moscow TASS in English
1514 GMT 13 Jan 92*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna January 13 (TASS)—Talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, confidence-building measures and continental security were resumed here today. The sides are discussing problems linked with the reduction of troops from the Atlantic to the Urals and new, far-reaching confidence-building measures, including military initiatives.

A note of the Russian Foreign Ministry was circulated the day before among the delegations taking part in the talks. It says the Russian Federation will continue the USSR's efforts in the CSCE process.

This refers to the foregoing Vienna talks and also to the joint consultative group on the conventional armed forces treaty for Europe, the consultative committee of the Centre for Preventing Conflicts, the unofficial consultations on the mandate of future talks on security and disarmament in Europe, and to the "open sky" negotiations.

"The Russian Federation," the note points out, "assumes full responsibility for the commitments, fixed by the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter for a new Europe, as well as other CSCE documents. It declares its resolution to adhere to provisions."

Reassures CFE Participants

*LD1601224392 Moscow TASS International
Service in Russian 1135 GMT 16 Jan 92*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Excerpt] Vienna, 16 Jan (TASS)—Russia will strictly observe the international obligations of the former Soviet Union in the field of limiting and reducing armaments. It intends to ensure total continuity in approaches to disarmament questions. This was stated by Ambassador Vladimir Shustov, the head of the Russian Federation's delegation at the CFE talks, where a plenary session was held today.

According to the ambassador, the priority objective of the Russian leadership is to ensure that the agreements

signed by the USSR, including the treaty on conventional forces in Europe, come into force as soon as possible. Within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia will strive to coordinate the actions of all the independent states in implementing the stipulations of this document that apply to the territory of the former Union, the diplomat stressed. [passage omitted]

The Russian delegation at the Vienna talks informed their partners that a commission of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet and other departments concerned with these issues are currently preparing the treaty on conventional armed forces for ratification. Similar work is being done in most other independent states belonging to the community.

Delegate Cited on Personnel Reductions

*LD2301184692 Moscow TASS in English
1744 GMT 23 Jan 92*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna January 23 TASS—Questions connected with working out an agreement on troops personnel in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals were in the focus of a plenary meeting at the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe on Thursday [23 January].

It is said in the lobbies of the forum the agreement will be politically binding. International affairs show that such agreements are tangible and are honoured. At the same time, a draft agreement on personnel proposed by a number of delegations contains provisions that are more characteristic of a legally binding agreement. Therefore, the partners in the negotiations should exert efforts to find mutually-acceptable solutions.

It was also discussed at the meeting how the principle of sufficiency could be reflected in the agreement. Vladimir Shustov, head of the Russian delegation, believes it would be expedient to determine it as a universal political principle of the construction of armed forces of any participating state. He told TASS this approach would emphasise the obligations of states to build its armed forces on the basis of self-restriction and an objective assessment of foreign threat, would prevent unjustifiable arms build-up and help strengthen confidence. Besides that, equality of all participating countries in implementing provisions of the future agreement would be ensured, for instance, in determining structures and tendencies of the construction of the armed forces and setting limits to personnel.

Belarus 'in No Hurry' To Increase Military

*PM1501104792 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1300 GMT 13 Jan 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast: Report by A. Guretskiy]

[Text] [Announcer] One of the latest decisions made by the Belarus Supreme Soviet was to establish a republic

ministry of defense. At the same time the text of the oath to be taken by troops stationed on the republic's territory was adopted.

[Guretskiy] Despite all this, the scions are in no hurry to set up their own, national army. The military building will take place in two stages.

This decision stems from the Belarussians' character and from the difficult situation in which they find themselves—a situation whereby Chernobyl has left more scars on the republic's territory than a war might have done.

During the draft last fall, five in 10 young men, that is half of them, were not accepted for military service because of poor health. This is why the republic is planning major troop cuts. According to Lieutenant General Petr Chaus, the Belarus defense minister, 30 percent of the funds allocated for the purchase of hardware and weapons will be switched to the construction of amenities, specifically housing, during the current year. The first five residential estates for servicemen's families are already under construction and will be handed over within 12 months.

TASS Cites FRG's Genscher on CFE, CSBM Talks

*LD1301215992 Moscow TASS in English
2126 GMT 13 Jan 92*

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Stepovik]

[Text] Bonn January 13 TASS—The resumed Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE] and on confidence- and security-building measures [CSBM] on the continent acquire particular importance in view of changes taking place in the former Soviet Union. German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher maintains in a statement circulated here on Monday [13 January].

One of the first priority goals of the German Government is to draw members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into the negotiating process and into involvement in European security structures. The entering into force of the first-ever treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), signed in 1990, will become an important prerequisite for that, Genscher pointed out.

The need to supplement the CFE treaty with a new one which would envisage a limitation on the numerical strength of the armed forces will be discussed in Vienna, Genscher noted.

"The German delegation has prepared an appropriate draft treaty and presented it to negotiators. Our purpose is to establish a stable situation in Europe's east through

negotiations and prevent an uncontrolled growth of the numerical strength of the armed forces of the CIS member states.

"The talks on confidence- and security-building measures provide a good chance to mold relations of openness between negotiating countries.

"The Federal Republic hopes that good groundwork will be laid during the present talks so that a package of important agreements could be prepared before a CSCE summit, to be held in Helsinki in spring this year," Genscher emphasised.

NACC Members Confer on CFE Implementation

PM1401120192 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 Jan 92 p 4

[Correspondent Vladimir Peresada report: "Treaty Must Operate. Commonwealth of Independent States Coordinates Ties with NATO"]

[Text] Brussels, 13 Jan—A session of a high-level working group formed under the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) has been held at the NATO Headquarters here. It was the first meeting of this kind within the framework of the NACC—an unprecedented institution of cooperation between the NATO countries and the states of Central and East Europe, which was set up last December. The working group examined questions connected with bringing into force the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe signed in Paris in 1990. They have arisen in connection with the changing political landscape in the eastern part of the European continent. Therefore, in addition to representatives of the NATO countries, East European countries, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which founded the NACC, representatives of seven republics of the former Soviet Union—now independent states whose territory falls within the zone of operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE]—were invited to the session and participated in it.

A brief yet very clear final communique was adopted. It emphasizes that the treaty is not liable to be revised and will come into force as soon as possible. The pledges made under the treaty by the former Soviet Union will be fulfilled by all the new independent states which have been formed within its zone of operation and will be allocated among them in a way that will prove acceptable to all the parties to the treaty. It is envisaged that this result will be achieved by the independent states collectively.

The communique states that the whole process of preparing to bring the treaty into force must also be very compressed. A formal date is not named, but the document in fact denotes the intention to complete it before the top-level meeting of CSCE participant states due in Helsinki this summer. The working group's second session will be held in Brussels as early as 14 February and will have an agenda focused on just this goal.

I asked V. Petrovskiy, Russia's special representative who participated in the meeting, to comment on its results.

"The whole purpose of this session," he said, "was defined as a very important question: how to bring the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe into force without delay. It has arisen because a totally new political and geographic reality has taken shape in the European part of the former USSR since the treaty was signed. In this connection we declared here that Russia, being the USSR's successor, retains full responsibility for all the former Union's rights and obligations stemming from the treaty. At the same time, however, we pointed out that the treaty can be applied effectively only if it is approved by all seven independent states which have been formed within its zone of operation.

"It is characteristic that the members of the working group unanimously advocated that not only Russia but also all the new independent states confirm their obligations under the treaty. I also wish to emphasize something else. Russia's stance in respect of the fact that the package of questions connected with bringing this treaty into force within the borders of the former USSR must be resolved by the new independent states jointly, together, met with full understanding. Proceeding precisely from this, the working group will examine political and juridical aspects of its ratification at its February session.

"Was everything 'smooth' among the representatives of our independent states?"

"Frankly speaking, there are nuances in the positions, but this, in general, is natural. I am not dramatizing this in any way, because the process of developing statehood is under way in the former republics. Each one has its own national interests, its own special features. The chief thing is that there is, on the whole, full understanding on fundamental, cardinal problems. No one has raised the question of revising the treaty. All are conscious of the need not only for its ratification but also for actions in keeping with the pledges contained in it. All advocate the speediest coming into force of the treaty's principles in the belief that it can be a launch pad for a new stage of disarmament. This is the most important result of the meeting."

Controversy With Poland Over Troop Withdrawal Pace

CIS Spokesman Denies Polish Report

LD1501193192 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1742 GMT 15 Jan 92

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, 15 Jan (TASS)—An official of the information administration of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] has refuted a

statement by an authorized spokesman of the government of the Polish Republic on questions of the Soviet troops' stay, Colonel Stefan Golebiowski. In an interview to the newspaper POLSKA ZBROJNA this Polish military man stated that in 1991 it had been proposed to withdraw from the Republic's territory "20 percent of the personnel of the Northern Group of Troops, comprising about 10,000 servicemen," but that in fact "only 4,300 Soviet servicemen left Poland." Since September of last year, the colonel asserted, the strength of the Soviet soldiers and combat equipment located here "has practically not been reduced."

"The withdrawal of units of the Northern Group of Troops from the territory of Poland is being conducted strictly in conformity with the ratified schedule," the spokesman for the information administration said. "This is well known to the Polish side. Last year a missile brigade, and a number of other units and subunits, with a total strength of more than 10,000 servicemen, left Poland. From the city of Brzeg, for instance, a fighter aircraft regiment was completely withdrawn—over 400 aircraft. By previous agreement, in the third quarter of this year the withdrawal of all combat units of the Northern Group of Troops is to be completed. There are no grounds to doubt that the schedule will be observed. The most important thing now is not to omit, as unfortunately happened before, the just resolution of the property and finance issues and social problems of our servicemen returning to the homeland."

Ambassador, Polish Official Cited

LD2201034192 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2002 GMT 21 Jan 92

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Malchun]

[Text] Warsaw, 21 Jan (TASS)—The Polish media are obviously understating the numbers of personnel and combat equipment of the Northern Group of Forces that are being withdrawn from the country's territory, announced Yuriy Kashlev, ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Poland. He made this announcement here today after a conversation with Minister of National Defense Jan Parys, during which there was a wide-ranging exchange of views with regard to the sociopolitical and socioeconomic situation in both neighboring countries, the future of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces, the problems of indebtedness, and mutual accounts in the military and strategic sphere.

Recalling that last year alone more than 10,000 servicemen had left Polish territory, Yu. Kashlev drew attention to the precise observation of the time scale confirmed by the sides. "Nothing can influence the time scale established during the talks—15 November 1992 as the final date for the withdrawal of combat units," he said.

Commenting on these remarks, the representative for the press attached to the Republic of Poland's official on

matters concerning the stay of foreign troops, Colonel Stefan Golebiowski, indicated that according to the assessment of the Polish side, only 4,300 servicemen of the Northern Group of Forces were withdrawn in 1991. It was not ruled out that the missing 6,000 people may have been transported home by air. The differences in the final figures were explained by the Polish authorities being insufficiently informed about the progress of the evacuation of the Northern Group of Forces.

Commentaries on U.S. Troop Withdrawals From Europe

End of Cold War Confirmed

LD1901064292 Moscow TASS in English 1611 GMT 17 Jan 92

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Kalintsev]

[Text] Bonn January 17 TASS—Two momentous events, confirming once more that the "cold war" is over, occurred today in Frankfurt-am-Main and Bamberg. The flags of two of the four U.S. divisions, deployed in Germany, were solemnly put down in these south German cities.

The ceremony, true enough, did not signify the withdrawal of all their servicemen from Germany. This refers primarily to the Third Armoured Division, which, as distinct from the Eighth Infantry Division, remains in Germany as a combat unit. Eleven thousand of its officers and men, out of a total of 17,000, will continue to serve in Germany but now under the colours of the First Tank [as received] Division, deployed at Rheinland-Pfalz. The rest of its personnel have already left Germany. They will form the backbone of their contingent in the United States.

Each U.S. serviceman's family was paid 8,000 dollars for transport expenses. This includes money for shipping home their personal luggage and private automobiles. However, these spendings are bound to pay back. Financiers have estimated that the maintenance of one GI truck in Europe costs the taxpayers 100 percent more money than in the United States.

This is one of the reasons why plans to withdraw U.S. troops from Germany are being stepped up, the more so since their need in Europe is being increasingly questioned after the ending of East-West confrontation. More than 40,000 U.S. servicemen and about 50,000 members of their families left Germany last summer. It is planned to ship home about 50,000 more officers and men by 1995, which will bring down the number of U.S. servicemen in Germany to 92,200. Experts now expect this level to be achieved two years ahead of this deadline, namely by the end of 1993.

U.S., Soviet Withdrawals Compared

*LD2101011692 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1310 GMT 18 Jan 92*

[Text] The beginning of the year marked the start of United States troops withdrawals from Europe. Commentary by Vadim Solovyev:

It was announced that this week three United States divisions deployed in Germany were getting ready to go home. The move is part of America's plan for troop withdrawals spread over several years. Although the United States military presence has been largely reduced, fewer divisions will stay put in Central Europe. By contrast, Soviet troops withdrawals have been going on for two years already, and will be finalized by the year 1994. There seems to be nothing to stop the process—the breakup of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the new Commonwealth of Independent States, or the split of the Armed Forces into national armies and joint Commonwealth forces. The commander in chief of the Commonwealth forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov, pointing to the resolutions by Commonwealth summits in Minsk and later in Alma-Ata, reaffirmed commitments to troop withdrawals in line with agreed schedules and obligations to earlier agreements.

In the meantime, with Soviet troops pulled out from Europe by the end of 1994, the question arises as to what sort of task is being assigned to the remaining United States troops there. True, the question of whether or not to deploy foreign troops on its soil is each country's own affair, but there seems to be a certain asymmetry in confidence building in the military area. Nor is it clear why this should be allowed to happen even that a Soviet former republic have defined their size of the armies, [as heard] which in itself is an indication of the number of troops to be faced with in the region.

The supreme commander of NATO's Armed Forces in Europe, General John Galvin, announced that the United States has just started to withdraw its short-range missiles from Europe as part of the plan spread over three years. None the less, the Americans will hold back two air-launch nuclear weapons, while all of the Soviet nuclear weapons have been pulled out from other countries. Rather, that the withdrawal is near completion of short-range nuclear weapons from the former Soviet republics for storage in Russia. It will take six months to finalize the operation in Ukraine, and a little more than that in Belarus. The process of defusing military tensions in Europe is well under way, albeit at a different pace. But it's in everyone's interest to make it more dynamic.

Russia Seeks To Sell Tanks Withdrawn From Europe

*LD2101050692 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 20 Jan 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The story about the tanks withdrawn from Eastern Europe last year has received an unusual continuation.

About 4,000 of them were stored in forests near Omsk. Already orders for purchasing the hardware have come from the Netherlands, Yemen, and other countries. North Ossetia, too, is ready to buy 15 tanks. The Russian Ministry of Economy has advised Siberians to sell old tanks by weight, at \$10,000 per ton. The problem is that Omsk has no license for selling weapons, INTERFAX reports.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Russian Delegate on Nuclear, Chemical Arms' Elimination

*LD2001134192 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1430 GMT 14 Jan 92*

[Text] In Geneva's Palais de Nations, where a session of the UN Disarmament Conference is under way, people are following with great anxiety the political squabbling within our Commonwealth over the command of the immense combat potential of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Our correspondent Farid Seyful-Mulyukov reports:

At issue are not only the strategic nuclear missiles, which will be under unified control, but also the tens of thousands of other weapons of mass destruction that have accumulated inside the collapsed Soviet empire, and the destiny of the thousands of first-class specialists in our military-industrial complex who, being threatened with unemployment, could become the quarry of adventurist regimes. Ultimately, how will the whole process of disarmament develop in these new conditions in the world? Who will implement the international agreements reached by Moscow on the reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons, and how?

In the opinion of the representatives of many states at the Geneva disarmament talks, the agreements from Alma-Ata and Minsk do not provide clear answers to all these questions.

Sergey Batsanov, Russia's representative at the Geneva conference, said in conversation with your correspondent that if members of the Commonwealth are going to continue their lengthy disputes concerning division of the immense military legacy of the erstwhile Soviet Union, this will quite likely have a negative effect on the global disarmament process. My colleagues abroad," Batsanov continued, are constantly expressing this concern. First and foremost, of course, it is essential to determine within the framework of the Commonwealth a precise schedule and the conditions for implementation of the America-Soviet treaty on radical cuts in offensive nuclear weapons. However, neither must we lose sight of the other acute problems of disarmament, for example, the elimination of chemical weapons.

According to information quoted by Sergey Batsanov at a news conference in Geneva for foreign journalists, around 40,000 tonnes of chemical weapons are concentrated on Russian territory. This is the gravest legacy left it by the Soviet military monster. How are these mountains of toxic materials to be destroyed safely? The erstwhile center did nothing to prepare for the elimination of the chemical weapons, Sergey Batsanov noted.

The UN General Assembly passed a resolution on the completion of the Geneva talks on chemical weapons this year. They are moving ahead successfully, the representative of Russia, the legal successor of the USSR at the Geneva conference, noted. Of course, the Russian leadership, Sergey Batsanov stressed, does have many other urgent domestic and international problems, but the problem of the elimination of chemical weapons cannot be cast aside or left in the pending tray. This affects the security of Russia and the whole Commonwealth, and security throughout the world.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Allegations of 1986 Test in Ukraine

AU0901142892 Kiev SAMOSTIYNA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian No. 20, Dec 91 p 3

[Unattributed article on alleged nuclear test conducted in the Ukraine in May 1986: "Nuclear Tests in the Ukraine. The Fact Needs to Be Investigated"—published in Russian]

[Text] We sat in the car and waited, not for one hour or two, but for four or five days. I was promised help and I promised assistance with building materials. Naturally because we do not smoke and we had to somehow kill time, we talked about everything.

I do not remember how all of this happened or how it started. I do not remember what I was thinking about. It did not immediately dawn upon me what he was talking about. I heard the word nuclear.

I asked him several times to say it again, without even understanding what it was all about. Only after he repeated the word "nuclear," did the meaning of his words begin to come home to me.

"I took part in nuclear tests."

He is about 30 and his occupation is the breeding of small fishes. He is a likable fellow. That is why I decided to help him.

"What tests, did you say? In what sense?"

"In the most direct sense. I took part in nuclear tests."

"In what way? Did you trigger the reactor?"

"No, a nuclear explosion."

!!! [as published]

"Has the long wait made you crazy? Nuclear tests are conducted in long-suffering Kazakhstan. Were you there?"

"No, in the Ukraine!"

"Perhaps, it was an underground explosion for national economic purposes?"

"It was above ground."

"Nonsense! This cannot be true! It is forbidden! Was it long ago?"

"It was real."

"Tell me."

He told me as follows:

"I served in a regiment that was equipped with self-propelled artillery, with 152-millimeter howitzers, and we were stationed in Korosten. At the end of April, I returned from leave. At the beginning of May (approximately between the 1st and the 15th, I do not remember exactly when), I, and other servicemen, were equipped with weapons and taken to the munitions dump. Several rows of barbed wire. A large box. It was opened and at first it seemed to me to be empty. However, it was not. There was an ammunition transporter in it. We were brought up to it. I had not seen anything like that before. It resembled a coffin with a cartridge case from our 152-mm shell fixed on top of it. Then we understood about the design of this box—it was the container. When necessary, wheels could be released from the bottom of it: It could roll over the ground. Or skis could be released: It could be pulled over the snow or ice. All the instruments necessary for servicing it were fixed onto it, and so on. The cartridge case was removed and the box was opened. Inside it, on a piece of velvet, lay our 152-mm shell. And how it looked! It was painted blue, nickel-plated, a real beauty. Damn it! I saw such a thing for the first and, hopefully, for the last time. The box was shut and we were ordered to lift it and load it on a car. However, it was not easy to do. It was covered with lead. A large team was necessary for loading it. It was loaded. We were ordered to load it onto the back of the truck. If somebody stopped the truck and started getting onto the back of it, we were ordered to shoot without warning! We rode. We arrived at the Zhitomir test site. The load was taken off and placed near a self-propelled gun. It was taken to a combat position. We opened the box. The shell was fixed to the box with clamps complete with encoded locks. It remained there for two days. We waited for the code. (As we found out later, the shell would have self-destructed had a wrong code been tried.)

The code arrived from Moscow by satellite communication. The locks were released. This was done by senior officers. With a special key fixed on the box, the type of explosion was set—above ground. It was loaded into the self-propelled gun and triggered. Bang—one, two, three... A huge orange-colored sphere was borne into the air. A terrifying spectacle! Later, an officer told us secretly that

we had participated in nuclear tests. The explosion was made above ground in order to make it more difficult to register. The explosion was not very powerful, though in principle such a shell would be sufficient to do away with Kiev.

That's it. In autumn, I was demobilized. In winter, I received a government award for service to the motherland. Later, I found out that our regiment had been disbanded."

Yes, I forgot to say that it was in 1986. Like that. In the confusion created by Chernobyl, a nuclear weapons test was conducted above ground in the Ukraine. Everything in this story is the TRUTH [as published], and an investigation needs to be made.

For obvious reasons I am signing an assumed name.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Controversy Over Secret Aral Sea BW Test Site

'Bombshell' in Kazakh Parliament

LD1301135492 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1200 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Mukhtar Shakhnov, chairman of the Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan international committee, dropped a bombshell today in a speech to the seventh session of the Kazakhstan parliament.

Citing foreign sources, he told the deputies about weird and wonderful goings-on within the republic. On the Aral Sea, an island called Vozrozhdeniye [Rebirth]: In Shakhnov's opinion, a more accurate name would be Vyrozhdeniye [Degeneration], because for five decades now bacteriological weapons [BW] have been tested there, with terrible consequences.

Only the ill-famed Semipalatinsk range has a worse public reputation than this notorious island. Together, they occupy 18 million hectares of fertile land in Kazakhstan. Not only ground, but also atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons and even neutron bombs have been held at them.

The Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan committee has issued an appeal to heads of state [not further specified] demanding the closure of the terrible range on Vozrozhdeniye island. Thousands of people living near the Aral have signed it.

This was a report from the AZIYA press agency.

Resolution Orders Closure

PM2401123192 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 92 p 2

[Unattributed report from AZIYA-PRESS, SIBIFORM, and TASS roundup]

[Text] The name of a top-secret bacteriological test site, located on the island of Vozrozhdeniye in the middle of

the Aral Sea, has been mentioned for the first time in open-source official documents. A special paragraph in the Resolution "On Urgent Measures To Radically Transform the Living Conditions of the Population of the Aral Region" adopted by the seventh session of the republic parliament, which ended the other day, reads as follows: "The activity of the military test site on the island of Vozrozhdeniye is deemed impermissible. The Kazakh Cabinet of Ministers is to study the activity of the test site and submit proposals on its closure in accordance with established procedure."

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Delegations Question CIS Nuclear Security

PM1301141992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Aleksandr Krivopalov and Aleksandr Sychev report: "U.S. Secretary of Defense Urges West To Prepare 'For Any Surprises' in the Commonwealth of Independent States"]

[Text] The future of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal seems more and more vague. Foreign delegations are visiting the now independent states that have emerged in the place of the USSR one after the other in an attempt to clarify their view of events taking place in our country and forecast their possible outcome.

B. Wilz, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union defense policy working group in the FRG Bundestag, has had a series of meetings in Minsk and Moscow. British Foreign Secretary D. Hurd will come to Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine in the second half of January. In the next few days a delegation of U.S. experts headed by Under Secretary of State R. Bartholomew will take the same route plus Belarus. U.S. and British Secretaries of Defense R. Cheney and T. King discussed the problems of Soviet nuclear weapons in London. R. Cheney's current trip to Europe, which is viewed as preparation for late January's UN Security Council summit meeting convened on the initiative of Britain's prime minister, will continue in Bonn.

One would have thought that there should not be any particular reason for concern. The Commonwealth states have agreed to preserve the unity of the strategic forces, given guarantees that they will ensure the safekeeping of mass-destruction weapons, and expressed willingness to unswervingly observe all the USSR's international commitments, and some states have made the attainment of nuclear-free status a top-priority task for their national security policy.

Nonetheless, fear of Soviet military might which had slackened off over the last few years has once again

shown a tendency to increase. Without doubt, the guarantees given by the Commonwealth's independent states are impressive and the West is trying not to cast doubt on them. But the presence of major destabilizing factors within the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] and the states that form it, together with ill-advised actions by the national governments, do not give politicians the right to rule out even the worst-case scenarios.

It is not surprising that the announcement that the Ukrainian authorities have decided to separate the troops stationed on their territory from the operational command and warning system used to control the armed forces was viewed with unconcealed concern at the meeting in London between the U.S. and British secretaries of defense. In R. Cheney's opinion, even the dispute over control of the Black Sea Fleet may at some stage develop into a conflict due to control of some strategic arms systems. Western defense ministers, R. Cheney concluded, must prepare "for any surprises."

The West thinks that there is a particular threat from tactical nuclear arms which may quite well enable the former Soviet republics to acquire the freely convertible currency they so badly need. Moreover, this category of arms is a tempting catch for terrorists.

What is more, according to some estimates, there are roughly 5,000 highly skilled specialists within the CIS with the knowledge needed to develop nuclear weapons. Social and economic disorganization may make many of them accept the alluring offers of work in their specialized sphere in countries like Iran, Libya, and North Korea.

Fissionable materials and nuclear technology are a profitable class of exports. It is known that last October the Italian police arrested a Swiss businessman trying to sell 4 grams of plutonium on the Italian market. Three Hungarians and an Austrian were recently arrested in Milan for shipping containers of superconductive crystals that specialists claim can be used to produce nuclear weapons. In both cases investigators suspect that the manufacturers are to be found on the territory of the former USSR.

"I am not sure that this process can be effectively stopped. Tomorrow there may be far more countries with nuclear weapons in the world than today," R. Cheney said in London during an interview with journalists. "Nonetheless something must be done."

We learned that, by way of preventive measures, the London meeting discussed the need to continue the work of creating an ABM defense system, the introduction of additional tough measures for international verification of nuclear nonproliferation, and aid for the CIS in the planned dismantling and destruction of missiles and the reliable storage of warheads removed from them. They also discussed the possibility of implementing programs to "provide Soviet scientists with material security," creating jobs for them, and funding future research work.

The group of experts led by R. Bartholomew, to whose mission Washington attaches particular significance, is studying all these problems. The delegation members, according to reports, will also try to clear up the situation regarding tactical nuclear weapons that are often moved from place to place due to interethnic conflicts that flare up in the Commonwealth states.

Problems of the Army as a whole and of nuclear weapons in the CIS in particular must be resolved by peaceful means alone, with the utmost caution and political perspicacity. The West, B. Wilz said at a Moscow press conference, is extremely interested in settling the matter and is ready to provide the requisite assistance.

Western Concerns Over Republics' Nuclear Role Viewed

U.S. Concerns on START Implementation

LD1301152892 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] The American military-political delegation headed by U.S. Under Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew, arrived this week in the Russian capital, Moscow. The delegation will also visit Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine. Discussions with political and military leaders of the four nuclear republics will center on the control of nuclear weapons and prospects for their reduction and nonproliferation. Our commentary is by Yuriy Solton.

[Solton] The American trip can justly be viewed as inspecting. It is understandable that the Americans wish to make sure that nuclear weapons accumulated by the now defunct Soviet Union, that is some 25-30 thousand warheads, have been placed under reliable control, that they cannot leak out from the territory of the former Soviet Union and that all agreements on nuclear weapons reductions will be observed. No doubt the American side will get all these guarantees.

But an inspection of the controls' reliability appears to be not enough under the circumstances. It's high time to discuss specific matters pertaining to dismantling nuclear weapons, including concrete technical things. True, the Soviet-American START Treaty signed last summer in Moscow is not yet ratified owing to the developments in the former Soviet Union. But this is a question of the near future. The Russian leadership, for one, has already declared it is prepared not only to observe the treaty provisions but to go far beyond the treaty boundaries. So it is planned to reduce strategic warheads not to 6,000 as stipulated by the treaty but to 3,000-4,000. Judging from reports from Washington the United States also intends to cut its nuclear arsenal, not by one-third as was previously planned but by half, leaving for itself only some 5,000 strategic warheads.

Last year Moscow and Washington declared it was time to start destroying tactical nuclear weapons. All four former Soviet republics where such weapons are deployed confirmed their loyalty to such a decision. However, what matters are not only political decisions but technical and economic possibilities for their realization. When the agreements on nuclear reductions were signed, the Soviet Union naturally counted on its own resources. But as things stand now, such an approach would be unrealistic. The process could be speeded up by the aid worth \$400 million already allocated by the American Congress and American technical assistance. True, some of the Soviet generals find it hard to part with the old stereotypes and continue to believe that the joint work could disclose for the Americans the Soviet nuclear secrets. But interaction is unavoidable in such a complex work.

Let's not foresee the results of the American delegation's visit to the Soviet Union. What matters here most is that the process of abolishing nuclear weapons started with the dismantling of American and Soviet medium and short range nuclear missiles would continue. This is in the interests of both the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States that has emerged on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

FRG, U.S. Differ on Tactical Arms

*PM2001111792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Jan 92 Morning Edition pp 1, 4*

[Aleksandr Sychev report: "No Unity in West Over USSR's Nuclear Legacy"]

[Excerpts] In ceasing to exist the Soviet Union has left behind it a terrible legacy—30,000 nuclear warheads on the territory of virtually all the former Soviet republics.

All Western capitals are wondering the same thing today—What should be done to lessen the threat from the arsenal inherited by the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]? But they have hitherto been unable to find a common answer to this question.

Last week the FRG Government submitted for the attention of its North Atlantic bloc partners its vision of ways of solving this problem, and this gave rise to disagreements among NATO members.

What did Bonn propose? In the opinion of the German Government, NATO should enter into talks on the future of the Soviet nuclear arsenal with all CIS states that have nuclear weapons on their territory. In Bonn's opinion, an agreement must be concluded with each of them on destroying all tactical nuclear arms. Moreover, all members of the disbanded Warsaw Pact must also be involved in the negotiating process within the framework of the recently created North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

Bonn's proposal was assessed positively by Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev, who recently paid an

official visit to the FRG. However, Washington saw Bonn's intention of binding all possessors of nuclear weapons within the CIS by pledges made by their present governments as threatening to slow down the disarmament process started by President G. Bush and former USSR President M. Gorbachev. [passage omitted]

Now that the USSR no longer exists the Americans reckon that the FRG's proposal will send the independent states the "wrong signals." In other words, Washington is afraid that the new sovereigns may regard the German initiative as an invitation to discuss the issue of tactical arms, which has already been decided.

Washington is pressing for the continuation of dialogue on nuclear issues on a bilateral basis between the United States and the CIS or Russia, which in the future must remain the only heir to the former USSR's nuclear might. [passage omitted]

The "cold war" fear of a possible Soviet nuclear strike has changed its nature today and has turned into fear of the unpredictable development of events in the CIS that have both strategic and tactical nuclear arms on their territory. The signals from us are too contradictory and the situation taking shape in and among the independent states is too unstable, and this will quite obviously prompt the West to formulate a common approach on the problem of the Soviet nuclear legacy in the near future.

Khasbulatov, Kissinger Discuss Russia's Nuclear Role

*LD1401200692 Moscow TASS in English
1942 GMT 14 Jan 92*

[Text] Moscow January 14 TASS—Chairman of the Russian parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov today met U.S. politician Henry Kissinger to discuss the international situation and Russian-American relations, the Russian parliament press centre said today.

Kissinger noted that Russia remained a great power. Because of this the Russian Federation alone should control the nuclear arms of the former Soviet Union. He called undesirable any other approach to the problem.

Khasbulatov spoke about the absurdity of the concept of collective control over mass destruction weapons by former Union republics. Khasbulatov said he was alarmed by attempts to split the Armed Forces at a moment when relations between republics have not yet achieved an inter-state level.

Khasbulatov said that, proceeding from good will principles, Russia could eliminate some of its nuclear arsenals if Ukraine and Kazakhstan agreed to eliminate a proportional number of their analogous arsenals.

Reports on Withdrawal of Nuclear Arms to Russia

Withdrawal From Ukraine

PM1401100192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Jan 92 p 1

[Lieutenant Colonel D. Anatolyev report: "Withdrawal of Nuclear Weapons from Ukrainian Territory Has Begun"]

[Text] Under the agreement signed by the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] in Minsk, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory for subsequent destruction has begun. This has been reported by RIA. The report has been confirmed by a General Staff directorate. Operations are being carried out by highly trained specialists.

According to the experts' figures, there are 1,408 strategic warheads (on ICBM's and heavy bombers) and 2,605 tactical nuclear warheads on Ukrainian territory. The agreement notes in particular that until complete destruction is achieved, the nuclear weapons deployed on Ukrainian territory will be under the control of the joint command of the strategic forces to ensure their nonuse and dismantling by the end of 1994. Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk stated at a press conference 2 January that the nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from the republic's territory for the purpose of their subsequent destruction. All tactical weapons are to be removed before 1993 and all strategic weapons before 1994.

The decision on the destruction of nuclear weapons results from the CIS' confirmation that it will observe the international treaties of the former USSR and pursue a coordinated policy in the sphere of international security, disarmament, and arms control. The Commonwealth states are to implement the provisions of the START Treaty. In addition, in the USSR president's counter initiative of 5 October 1991 approved by the State Council, a decision was adopted on a deeper reduction of strategic offensive arms than envisaged by the START Treaty. By the end of the seven year period of reductions, the number of strategic nuclear warheads in our possession should be 5,000 and not 6,000 as laid down by the treaty. The USSR also pledged to scrap all nuclear artillery munitions and nuclear warheads for tactical missiles.

The nuclear weapon withdrawal raises security questions—both ours and the world public are concerned about the accidental (unauthorized) use of nuclear weapons, especially tactical weapons, as the "most destabilizing" factor. The General Staff directorate which KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent contacted and the missile forces and artillery headquarters of the Ground Forces artillery noted that unauthorized use has been ruled out. The storage of nuclear weapons is rigidly centralized and they are operated by highly trained specialists. In addition, each munition is equipped with a coded device which prevents anyone from using it

unless a special coded signal is received from the General Staff; this, in turn, cannot be given without the consent of the political leadership.

Timetables for Tactical, Strategic Arms

OW1401131192 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1215 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Tactical nuclear arms are being pulled out from Belarus as well as Ukraine. The withdrawal should be completed by July 1.

As for strategic weapons, under the Minsk accords they will be dismantled in Ukraine by the end of 1994. The territories of Belarus and Kazakhstan will be cleared of strategic nuclear armaments in line with the Soviet-American START treaty. Initially the strategic nuclear arsenal of the USSR was supposed to be reduced to 6,000 units within 7 years after the ratification of the treaty. However, later the Soviet side unilaterally decided to cut down the number of units to 5,000.

Kozyrev: Tactical Weapons Out of Baltics

OW1601220792 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2115 GMT 16 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A communique on results of the Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's visit to Estonia January 14 made public Thursday [16 January] says that the tactical nuclear weapons have been completely withdrawn from the Baltics.

Kozyrev made this statement after the Estonian side had expressed concern about the issue.

The two sides stressed the necessity to withdraw the troops in stages, taking into account the interests of mutual security, as well as the real situation in the social sphere. As BF's [BALTFAX's] correspondent reports, at the same time, the communique and the Estonian Foreign Ministry's official report say nothing about the exchange of the Russian-Estonian bilateral treaty ratification documents, meaning that the treaty has not yet come into effect.

Naval Weapons From Ukraine

LD1601100792 Kiev Radio Kiev International
Service in Ukrainian 0100 GMT 16 Jan 92

[Text] The Black Sea Fleet also has become involved in the process of dismantling or removing nuclear weapons beyond Ukraine's borders. As we were informed at the Ukraine Defense Ministry, the nuclear warheads are being transported by rail out of Ukraine to the places where they will be destroyed at the nuclear arms producing plants. By 1 July, there will be no nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory at all.

Ukraine To Be Nuclear-Free by 2000

LD1701185692 Moscow TASS in English 1248 GMT
17 Jan 92

[By TASS correspondent Aleksey Golyayev]

[Text] Rome, January 17 (TASS)—Ukraine plans to get rid of nuclear weapons deployed on its territory by the year 2000, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said.

In an interview with the Italian magazine EPOCA, Kravchuk said Ukraine is ready to sign an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and will call for the elimination of all nuclear warheads on its territory.

"The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union envisages the elimination of 130 nuclear warheads in Ukraine. But we have counted 176 of them," Kravchuk said.

"We want to include another 46 warheads into the agreement and hope to get rid of the most part our nuclear weapons by 2000. I said the most part because technical problems remain. There is only one specialised centre to destroy nuclear missiles in the former Soviet Union, in the Urals," the Ukrainian leader said.

Progress Report on Ukraine

LD2201182892 Moscow TASS International
Service in Russian 1735 GMT 22 Jan 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Nikolay Zaika]

[Text] Kiev, 22 Jan (TASS)—The withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the Ukraine's territory is proceeding in an organized fashion, and so far the schedule for dispatch has been fulfilled by 30 percent. A procedure for implementing the program for destroying strategic nuclear weapons so that Ukraine is a nuclear-free power by 1994 is being devised.

This was announced today at a session of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet's Commission for Defense and National Security. The commission adopted a statement on the republic's military policy. It registers a vigorous protest against "the campaign launched by the former center aimed at distorting and falsifying Ukraine's policy on creating its own armed forces."

NRRC Commander Rules Out Nuclear Misuse

AU2101132592 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
17 Jan 92 p 14

[Interview with Major General Vladimir Medvedev, Commander in Chief of the National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the former USSR, by Jan Zizka; place and date not given: "Nuclear Weapons Are Under Strict Control"]

[Text] The fate of nuclear weapons on the territory of the former USSR is a subject of anxious discussion in the world. Major General Vladimir Medvedev, Commander

in Chief of the National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center [NRRC] at the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the former USSR, answered several questions by our reporter about the nuclear arsenal in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

[Zizka] What are the duties of your center, and what does it deal with at present?

[Medvedev] The NRRC's were created in Washington and Moscow on the basis of the Soviet-American treaty of 1987. Their main task is to exchange information on nuclear facilities. The centers inform each other 24 hours in advance when a rocket is launched. Our center takes part in organizing inspections. We cooperate with a corresponding agency in the United States. In the last three years, we have accepted 550 American inspection groups on our territory.

[Zizka] Who will participate in the talks on nuclear weapons in the United States in the future?

[Medvedev] This question is currently being discussed. The overall political line regarding nuclear weapons, including the future negotiations, is being discussed. I believe the CIS will find a convenient alternative and decide whom it will entrust with these negotiations. Now I am able to say that Russia—as the legal successor to the USSR, and therefore a party to international treaties signed by the former Soviet Union—will play a leading role. This does not exclude—on the contrary, it presumes—the participation of all other states in the negotiations, if they so wish.

[Zizka] Can Russia's exceptional position with regard to nuclear weapons give rise to pressure by this largest CIS state on other states?

[Medvedev] I do not think that such danger exists. The main part of the nuclear facilities is deployed in Russia. Russia is the former Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, and it has never exerted pressure on other republics.

[Zizka] Beyond the CIS borders, tactical nuclear weapons raise more fears than the strategic nuclear weapons of the former USSR. Do you think that there is any possibility of their being sold to other countries, or even terrorist groups?

[Medvedev] I absolutely exclude any such possibility. In order to reduce anxiety regarding tactical weapons, the CIS states are taking steps to remove tactical weapons from the republics with the goal of liquidating them. You know, for example, that the Ukraine declared that all tactical weapons will be removed from its territory in the first half of 1992. The situation is similar in other states.

[Zizka] To what extent are tactical nuclear weapons under unified command?

[Medvedev] To the same extent as other nuclear weapons. That is, they are absolutely controlled.

[Zizka] Is the control over nuclear weapons really so strict that it is impossible to misuse them?

[Medvedev] Of course. All nuclear weapons are under strict control everywhere.

[Zizka] I would be interested in the fate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Has it been preserved in some form?

[Medvedev] There are still some armed forces whose fate is being discussed. For the time being, it is impossible to say what the main organs of the CIS and republican Armed Forces will look like. Today, we have a commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces. The apparatus that was formerly the Ministry of Defense remains in place. So does the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The control over army cannot be discontinued.

GERMANY

Leaders Assess Bush's 'Drastic' Arms Reductions

Kohl Comments

LD2901113192 Berlin ADN in German 0727 GMT
29 Jan 92

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Chancellor Helmut Kohl assesses the announcement by U.S. President George Bush that there are to be drastic unilateral reductions in U.S. strategic nuclear weapons as a visible sign that security policy has attained a new quality worldwide. With his latest decision, Bush takes into account the profound changes in Europe and the world and once again sets the pace in international disarmament, Kohl said in Bonn on Wednesday [29 January].

Kohl hopes that the disarmament offer made to Russia and the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States—which goes beyond unilateral U.S. steps—will be taken up by President Yeltsin and the leaders of the other republics.

The Bush initiative is an important contribution to confidence-building, especially regarding the concern about the future of the former Soviet Union's nuclear potential.

Genscher Comments

LD2901113792 Hamburg DPA in German 0537 GMT
29 Jan 92

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher welcomes the announcement by the U.S. President on further disarmament steps. George Bush is responding to the changed world situation and is turning back the arms spiral, says a statement by Genscher issued by the Foreign Ministry in Bonn on Wednesday [29 January]. The catalogue of measures for reviving the U.S. economy is also significant and will have an effect on the development of the world economy.

UNITED KINGDOM

Major Comments on Bush's 'Imaginative Initiative'

UK Policy on Trident SSBN's

LD2901032692 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 0038 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] The Prime Minister today welcomed President Bush's "important and imaginative initiative" and said he had addressed the problem "squarely and imaginatively". Mr Major stressed that Trident was the minimum strategic deterrent necessary to guarantee Britain's future security.

"I warmly welcome President Bush's latest proposals for strategic arms reductions and I congratulated the President earlier this week on this important and imaginative initiative," he said. "The proposals address the key problems facing us in the strategic arena, namely how to increase global security and stability against the uncertain background of events in the former Soviet Union, and how to reduce the threat of nuclear confrontation."

"I very much hope that the Commonwealth of Independent States leaders will respond positively to this initiative. For my part I will certainly support it in my talks with President Yeltsin on Thursday, January 30."

"The offer of further agreed reductions in strategic missiles deals with the problem of the most destabilising heavy missiles. This is a matter that is outstanding from the START negotiations."

"We believe it should be immensely reassuring to the Commonwealth States."

Mr Major added: "The President's measures are a further step in reversing the process of nuclear competition between the super-powers. The security of the world will be greatly enhanced if President Yeltsin agrees to the elimination of the multiple warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles—the most destabilising elements of the old cold war confrontation."

"The way will then be open for Russia to move with the United States towards a more stable minimum deterrence increasingly concentrated on submarine forces."

"The United Kingdom has always been committed to maintaining only a minimum nuclear deterrent. We announced last autumn a cut of about a half in the number of British sub-strategic weapons. In our view Trident is the minimum strategic deterrent necessary to guarantee this country's future security."

"The greatest danger we face is not the existence of deterrent forces but the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons into the hands of other powers in unstable regions of the world."

"The President's very welcome initiative addresses this problem squarely and imaginatively."

Remarks on Yeltsin's Response

LD2901132492 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1215 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Report by Chris Moncrieff, PRESS ASSOCIATION political editor]

[Text] The prime minister today hailed Boris Yeltsin's "positive response" to President Bush's dramatic and historic package of nuclear arms reductions in his overnight state of the union address to Congress. Mr Major, who will greet President Yeltsin in London tomorrow, was said to be "very pleased" at this response, even though most of it was predictable.

Within hours of President Bush's address, Mr Yeltsin announced that Russia had taken about 600 strategic land and sea-based nuclear missiles off alert and had sharply curbed the production of long-range nuclear bombers. "Nuclear weapons and other mass destruction means of the world must be eliminated," he declared.

But even if he repeats ex-Soviet President Gorbachev's continual demand that the United Kingdom should also take part in the reductions, Mr Major has no intention of reducing the Trident programme. Trident is regarded as the minimum strategic deterrent necessary to guarantee Britain's future security. It is felt that the reductions now in prospect by the United States and Russia do not reduce Britain's strategic needs. One source said Britain's share of nuclear weaponry would be "but a flea-bite" compared with what the United States and the former Soviet republics would still possess even after these massive cuts had been implemented. Russia and the U.S. would still have about 15 times the number of warheads the UK possesses.

The prime minister's meeting tomorrow with Mr Yeltsin in Downing Street, expected to last about an hour, follows a transformation in recent years in the relationship between Britain and Russia. Recently Britain was the first: to denounce the August coup; to encourage Russia's entry into the International Monetary Fund; to suggest an early deadline, April, for the conclusion of the IMF negotiations; to propose a ruble stabilisation fund.

Mr Yeltsin will arrive in London on his way to New York for the special session of the United Nations Security Council to consider the break-up of the Soviet Union. The prime minister, who will chair the session, will have dinner with President Bush in New York soon after his arrival tomorrow evening.

Before leaving London Mr Major and Mr Yeltsin will appear on the steps of Downing Street to make statements and answer questions. Then Mr Yeltsin will pay a visit to Mrs Thatcher.

At the meeting the Prime Minister and President Yeltsin will sign a 10-point joint declaration committing themselves: to a relationship of friendship as partners within the international community; to the peaceful settlement of disputes; to the secure control of weapons of mass destruction; to the non-proliferation treaty and to strict controls on biological and chemical weapons; to co-operation in the destruction and safe disposal of surplus weapons in Russia; to co-operation between armed forces and defence ministries; Britain to help with the creation of a free market and the integration of Russia in the world economic system; Britain to continue to support Russia's application for IMF membership; Britain to support the development of effective ties between the EC and the Russian Federation; both sides to sign a Russo-British Treaty.

Defense Secretary Comments

*LD2901135192 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1305 GMT 29 Jan 92*

[Report by Charles Miller, PRESS ASSOCIATION defense correspondent]

[Text] Britain is to press ahead with plans to boost its nuclear firepower despite deep cuts by the United States and Russia, the government said today. But Defence Secretary Tom King said Britain's nuclear arms capability had always been in a different league to that of the superpowers. He stressed the need to retain a minimum but credible nuclear deterrent, capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on an aggressor. "People have to understand that what we are seeing is the abolition of a league of which we have never been a member," he said. "We were never part of the build-up. And the build-down to more sensible levels is something we are not involved in either."

President Bush proposed 27 billion pounds sterling of new cuts in his State of the Union address last night, singling out long-range nuclear missiles and production of B-2 stealth bombers for cutbacks. And within hours Boris Yeltsin announced that Russia had taken about 600 strategic land and sea-based nuclear missiles off alert and had sharply curbed the production of long-range nuclear bombers.

Prime Minister John Major praised Mr. Yeltsin's response and is due to meet him in London tomorrow. But he has no intention of cutting back the Trident programme and this point was repeated by Mr. King. He said plans would continue to replace the Polaris system, which has between 100 and 192 nuclear warheads, with Trident, with a maximum of 512 warheads.

Reiterating government policy, he said the increased firepower was required to guarantee success against increasingly sophisticated missile defences. He acknowledged the rapidly changing circumstances in Russia and the other independent states but stressed a potentially dangerous situation remained. "Our enemy are those thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons that are sitting there and will be sitting there for years and years to come. We have to protect ourselves and have an ultimate essential safeguard against those falling into the wrong hands. If they did fall into the wrong hands and we had taken the gamble and let our safeguard go we would never be forgiven by our successors."

Mr. King said that even if all the weapons earmarked in the Russian cutbacks were dismantled as planned over the next 10 years, the remaining nuclear arsenal would still be 20 times as large as that of Britain. "That should bring home to people the completely different scale of things."

He hinted that the Polaris submarine fleet might have changed its targeting policy following NATO's announcement last year that it no longer viewed the

former Soviet Union as its adversary. "You can intelligently draw your own conclusions from that," he said.

President Bush's proposals could eliminate some 2,000 U.S. warheads and 5,000 in the former Soviet Union. Mr. Bush has offered to scrap the U.S. 50 MX missiles, each capable of carrying 10 warheads, and to cut the three-warhead Minuteman missiles to just one warhead each if agreement is reached with the new Commonwealth of Independent States. He also offered to reduce the estimated 3,400 submarine-based U.S. nuclear warheads by about one-third if the Commonwealth gets rid of its SS-18, SS-24, SS-19 and other land-based multi-warhead systems which carry more than 5,000 warheads.

While Mr. Major is having talks with Mr. Yeltsin tomorrow, Mr. King is due to meet Marshal Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of the joint armed forces. Mr. King will offer British help in dismantling nuclear weapons. This could include the secure transport of nuclear warheads, the disposal of fissile material in nuclear power stations and the provision of key technologies. A key issue will be the fate of the Commonwealth's nuclear scientists facing lucrative enticements to work for Third World countries. Mr. King said this required an international approach and discussions would continue when Mr. Yeltsin flies to New York after his London visit.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

28 APRIL 1992